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I. INTRODUCTION
Repeal of federal estate taxes,' elimination of the rule against per-
petuities, 2 changes in definitions of principal and income,3 and a host
of revisions to established doctrine in the Uniform Probate Code4 have
changed the terrain of estate planning so dramatically that it is al-
most unrecognizable from that of a decade ago. Some of these mod-
1. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38 (2001).
2. Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No
Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000); Angela M. Vallario,
Death By a Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141
(1999). According to a leading casebook, "[t]here is now a movement afoot in
[states that have not yet repealed the Rule] to abolish the Rule's application to
trusts of personal property." JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRusTs AND ESTATES 854 (6th ed. 2000).
3. UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 102, 7B U.L.A. 138 (1997).
4. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE Art. II Prefatory Note, 8 U.L.A. 75 (1998) (identify-
ing the importance of intent serving policies in place of formalism as one of three
themes prompting revision of the original UPC).
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ernizations reflect changes in societal preferences and values, but
many simply replace fixed rules that produce predictable results with
a more flexible approach designed to effectuate the presumed intent of
the donor where the language of the dispositive instrument fails to
achieve that result due to lawyer error or other reason.
The movement away from fixed rules in the law of wills, though
not entirely free of controversy, has enjoyed widespread support.5 In
an area of law that heavily values the certainty produced by fixed
rules,6 such support might not have been expected. An important fac-
tor reducing the basis for objection to these modernizations, no doubt,
is the retention of "safe harbors," which provide assurance that actual
intent, if expressed in a particular manner (albeit not the historic
manner) will be respected. 7 These safe harbors permit careful testa-
tors to preclude litigation over intent and protect against the possibil-
ity that intent will be discerned inaccurately based on extrinsic
evidence that is outside their control.
The most fundamental of all changes in the law of wills is the re-
interpretation of the Statute of Wills to accommodate reformation of
wills on the grounds of mistake which does not incorporate such a safe
harbor. The historic approach provided a safe harbor by demanding
absolute deference to the testator's wishes as written, foreclosing any
opportunity to reform a will based on an alleged mistake.8 The liber-
alized approach to reformation, adopted by the Third Restatement of
the Law of Property (Donative Transfers),9 the Third Restatement of
Trusts,1O the Uniform Trust Codell and at least one state legisla-
ture,12 provides none. Instead, it permits re-writing of wills whenever
5. See infra note 28.
6. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Cohen, 606 N.E.2d 901 (Mass. 1993).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 233, 272 and accompanying text.
8. Hoover v. Roberts, 58 P.2d 83 (Kan. 1986).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1995) [hereinafter THIm RESTATEMENT]. This material is not yet published in a
hardbound volume of the Restatement, but it has been approved by the full mem-
bership of the American Law Institute and thus is an approved part of the
Restatement.
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTs § 62 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). This was
approved by the full membership of the American Law Institute at its 2001 An-
nual Meeting, subject to discussion at that meeting and final editorial revisions.
The official text for this material is expected to be published in 2002.
11. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 414 (2000), at http://wwv.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/trst400.
htm.
12. In Iowa, a reformation statute patterned on the Uniform Trust Code was adopted
effective July 1, 2000. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.2206 (West Supp. 2001). In New
York, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has proposed legislation
based on the Third Restatement. See Proposed N.Y. EsT. PoWERS & TRusTs LAW
§ 2-1.15 (on file with the author). There has been some indication that courts
may be receptive to the Third Restatement's position as well. See Putnam v. Put-
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the fact finder concludes there is clear and convincing evidence that
the will does not embody the testator's actual dispositive wishes.
To date, commentators have hailed the change without analyzing
the impact of the loss of the safe harbor.13 This Article seeks to pro-
vide that analysis by exploring the value of reformation relief, consid-
ering the policy impact of abandoning the safe harbor, and
questioning the desirability of the trade-off reflected in the moderniza-
tion adopted by the Third Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code.
Part II begins by comparing the historic approach to will reforma-
tion with two alternatives:14 the approach adopted by the Third Re-
statement and an approach advocated by Professor Fellows.' 5 The
discussion of these approaches identifies shortcomings of any single
approach to divining donative intent and the consequent desirability
of a system that incorporates elements of multiple approaches. Exam-
ination of a sampling of mistake cases highlights the overbreadth of
the historic approach's safe harbor as well as the safe harbor's indis-
pensability in shielding individuals from perversion of their testamen-
tary wishes.
Part III evaluates the policy implications of liberalizing relief for
mistake by examining the impact of such a change on individuals'
ability to control their estate plans, lawyers' incentives to exercise
care in the planning process, and the legal system's tolerance to bear
the administrative cost involved.16 Using an unmarried same sex
couple as an example, section A of Part III argues that elimination of
nam, 682 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1997) (expressing, in dictum, approval of the Third
Restatement's reformation provisions).
13. See Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Reformation of Wills: The Implications of Restatement
(Third) of Property (Donative Transfers) on Flawed but Unambiguous Testa-
ments, 25 ACTEC NOTES 299 (2000); see also Clark Shores, Reforming the Doc-
trine of No Reformation, 26 GoNz. L. REv. 475 (1990/91) (advocating that courts
should be able to reform mistakes in a will and should be able to admit extrinsic
evidence without finding any ambiguity).
14. Other approaches to reformation have been suggested as well. See Jane B.
Baron, Intention, Interpretation and Stories, 42 Duim L.J. 630 (1992) (advocating
a storytelling approach to reformation); Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills
Resulting from Scrivener's Errors: The Argument for Reformation, 40 CAm. U. L.
REv. 1 (1990) (advocating a reformation doctrine for scrivener's errors); James A.
Henderson, Jr., Mistake and Fraud in Wills-Part II: A Suggested Statutory De-
parture, 47 B.U. L. REv. 461 (1967) (advocating a statute to permit reformation in
specified circumstances); James L. Robertson, Myth and Reality-Or is it "Per-
ception and Taste"?-In the Reading of Donative Documents, 61 ForDHAM L. REv.
1045 (1993) (advocating a circumstanced external approach to interpretation of
donative documents). For a discussion of related doctrines under which a testa-
mentary trust may be modified based on consent of beneficiaries and in other
circumstances, see Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in
the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 RFAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2001).
15. Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IowA L. REV. 611 (1988).
16. See infra notes 169-217 and accompanying text.
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the safe harbor, though it may benefit a majority of testators, pro-
duces a discriminatory impact on those whom other provisions of the
law of wills protect least. Section B argues that the specter of mal-
practice liability, largely or entirely eliminated by liberalized reforma-
tion relief, motivates lawyers and testators to avoid errors in the
planning process while recognizing that malpractice as a remedy is a
flawed means of effectuating intent. Finally, section C argues that the
cost of reformation should be avoided where the inquiry is likely to be
unproductive.
Part IV advocates an alternative approach to reformation that is
designed to advance the competing policy considerations by offering
many of the benefits of the liberalized approaches while preserving
the safe harbor that is the cornerstone of the historic prohibition on
reformation.17 Specifically, this Article suggests a privately adaptable
rule' 8 which would preclude reformation of unambiguous wills unless
either the testator affirmatively elected to confer upon the court a
power of reformation or the will failed to satisfy specific pre-estab-
lished criteria designed to protect against ill-advised decisions to pre-
clude reformation. This proposal would permit reformation but at the
same time grant testators the ability to preclude courts from "cor-
recting" unambiguous dispositions in contravention of the testator's
actual and 'accurately expressed intent. While the proposal imposes
an additional burden in the planning process and only unifies the ref-
ormation standards for wills and will substitutes imperfectly, it does
balance the interests of those who err against the interests of those
who do not in a manner that offers important protections for both
groups.
II. DISCERNING TESTAMENTARY INTENT
Testamentary freedom promises individuals the ability to control
devolution of their property at death, but realization of the promise
occurs only if the wishes are ascertained accurately in a court proceed-
ing that occurs after death.19 To facilitate realization of testamentary
freedom, the law historically has required individuals to set forth dis-
17. See infra notes 218-272 and accompanying text.
18. The term is borrowed from Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L.
REv. 953 (1995).
19. It is possible to devise a system for pre-mortem probate, but such a system in-
volves significant issues. See generally George S. Alexander & Albert M. Pear-
son, Alternative Models of Ante-Mortem Probate and Procedural Due Process
Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. Ruv. 89 (1979); John H. Langbein, Living
Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REv. 63 (1978). Consequently,
most jurisdictions have not embraced the concept. See also Dara Greene, An-
temortem Probate: A Mediation Model, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 663 (1999)




positive desires in a written statement 20 executed with formalities 2 1
sufficient to identify to the individual executing the instrument and
the world at large that the writing is intended to be a will. 2 2
The requirement to set forth testamentary wishes in a will creates
two potential problems for testators. First, the formalities required
for wills may be complied with imperfectly, resulting in refusal to pro-
bate the document containing the testamentary wishes. Second, a
properly executed will may fail to communicate testamentary wishes
accurately.
To minimize the situations in which imposition of formalities will
preclude probate of instruments intended to constitute wills, several
reforms have been enacted. One such reform is the modification of
will execution statutes to streamline the required formalities. The
Uniform Probate Code (UPC), for example, dispenses with formalities
found in older statutes such as the requirement for the testator to
publish the will (i.e., signify that the document is his will) to the at-
testing witnesses, the requirement for the testator to sign the will at
the end (as opposed to some other place on the will), and the require-
ment for the witnesses to sign "in the presence of" the testator or in
the presence of each other.2 3 Another legislative reform, also embod-
ied in the UPC, denominated the "harmless error" rule, allows courts
20. Oral (nuncupative) wills generally are not permitted although they may be per-
missible to govern disposition of personal property of modest value or to govern
disposition of estates of soldiers in active military service or mariners at sea. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. h (1999).
21. Formalities vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but they generally track one of
three models: the highly formalistic Wills Act, 1837, 7 Win. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26. § 9;
the less formalistic Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 5; or the streamlined
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502. In several jurisdictions, unwitnessed instru-
ments may be admitted to probate as holographs if written in the testator's hand-
writing, signed by the testator, and in some jurisdictions, dated in the testator's
handwriting. Id. §§ 3.1, 3.2 (listing, as of October, 1998, the following jurisdic-
tions recognizing holographs: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Maine, Maryland (persons in
the armed services only), Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York (persons in the armed services only), North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming).
22. The Statute of Wills serves four functions: a ritual function, which identifies the
instrument as a will in the decedent's eyes; a channeling function, which identi-
fies the instrument as a will in the eyes of the world at large; a protective func-
tion, which increases the difficulty of deception or coercion of the testator; and an
evidentiary function which provides the court with substantial evidence of testa-
mentary intent and the terms of the will. Ashbel G. Guliver & Catherine J. Til-
son, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941); see also John H.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 489, 491-
498 (1975) (introducing the channeling function).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, supra note 20, § 3.1 cmts.
h, k, 1, p.
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to excuse execution defects, however serious, upon a showing by clear
and convincing evidence that the testator intended the document to be
his will.24 In the many jurisdictions where the harmless error rule
has not been enacted, some courts have adopted a relaxed approach to
execution requirements, excusing defects so long as the execution sub-
stantially complies with the statutory requirements.
2 5
Reduction of formalities limits the possibility that defective execu-
tion will preclude probate without reducing the certainty about which
writings will and will not qualify as testamentary writings. In con-
trast, the harmless error rule and, to a lesser degree, the substantial
compliance doctrine, do reduce the ability to predict in advance which
writings will qualify as wills because they rely on extrinsic evidence of
the testator's intent rather than formalities alone to establish the tes-
tamentary character of an instrument. In effect, the more liberal re-
forms eliminate the safe harbor that exists under an approach that
requires strict compliance with the formalities prescribed by the Stat-
ute of Wills and thus create the possibility that an instrument will be
admitted to probate which the testator did not intend to constitute his
will. This concern is minimized, however, by the reliance on the objec-
tive requirements of the Statute of Wills as a frame of reference for
evaluating the subjective question whether a particular document was
intended to constitute a will.26 Thus, refraining from execution of in-
struments with formalities similar to those of the applicable Statute of
Wills will all but preclude the possibility that an instrument other
24. The UPC's harmless error rule provides:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not exe-
cuted in compliance with [the Statute of Wills], the document or writing
is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that [statute] if
the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to
constitute (i) the decedents will, (ii) a partial or complete revocation of
the will, (iii) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or (iv) a partial or
complete revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will or of a formerly
revoked portion of the will.
UNIF. PROBATE. CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L. 146 (1998).
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991) (adopting substantial
compliance doctrine); Langbein, supra note 22 (explicating and advocating adop-
tion of the substantial compliance doctrine).
26. The substantial compliance doctrine expressly requires consideration of the for-
malities of the particular wills statute. The dispensing power, though framed as
purely a test of intent, nevertheless relies on the Statute of Wills as a measure-
ment of testamentary intent. See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors
in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate
Law, 87 CoLui. L. REv. 1, 22 (1987) (ranking wills act formalities in terms of
persuasiveness in establishing testamentary intent). After evaluating results
achieved under the substantial compliance doctrine and the harmless error rule,
Langbein expressed preference for the latter. Id.
2001]
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than one intended to constitute a will may be admitted to probate.27
This perhaps explains the substantial support for this reform in the
scholarly commentary. 28
The second problem occasioned by the Statute of Wills, failure to
articulate testamentary wishes accurately, is more intractable than
the problem of improper execution because execution formalities are
merely a means to the end of identifying the character of an instru-
ment as testamentary or not, whereas the communication of disposi-
tive wishes is the ultimate purpose of the will. This problem of
discerning actual intent arises whenever the will is alleged to be inac-
curate, either because it conveys wishes ambiguously or because it
conveys wishes unambiguously but incorrectly.
General principles of construction, which provide that instruments
ought to be read in the context of the surrounding circumstances in
which they were prepared, allow for remedy in the case of ambiguous
27. There is a risk that a non-testamentary instrument may be admitted to probate
pursuant to the dispensing power, but a similar, and broader, risk has always
existed in jurisdictions that recognize holographic wills. In the case of a ho-
lograph, the court must determine whether the handwritten instrument is in-
tended to constitute a will, and in those cases there is not, of course, a set of
formalities to serve as an objective reference for analyzing the issue. Conse-
quently, there is wider latitude to admit to probate instruments that may not
have been intended to constitute wills. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d
931 (Mont. 2000) (admitting letter in which decedent stated "'ll have the lawyer
visit the hospital to be sure you inherit the [Montana property] if it comes to that"
as valid holographic codicil).
28. Those who support relaxation of formalities offer supplements or alternatives to
the dispensing power or substantial compliance doctrine to minimize formalistic
bars to the exercise of testamentary freedom. See, e.g., James H. Lindgren, The
Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992) (approving of dispensing power
but suggesting elimination of formalities retained by the 1990 UPC revisions);
James H. Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 541 (1990) (proposing abolition of the attestation requirement for wills); C.
Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism and Legislative Reform: An
Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the
Movement Toward Amorphism-Part Two: Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503
and a Counterproposal, 43 FLA. L. REv. 599 (1991) (questioning the logic of the
dispensing power and suggesting as an alternative unification of the law of testa-
mentary and non-testamentary donative transfers). See also Bruce H. Mann,
Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1033
(1994) (discussing the "enduring and perhaps inescapable tension" over the role
of formalism in private law adjudication in the context of the 1990 UPC revi-
sions). But see Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of
Wills: Some Guidance from the Past, 70 TuL. L. REV. 1893 (1996) (questioning
whether the protections afforded by wills act formalities will be retained if the
dispensing power is adopted); William F. Ormiston, Formalities and Wills: A Plea
for Caution, 54 AusT. L. J. 451 (1980) (arguing against a general dispensing
power or standard of substantial compliance); Simon N. L. Palk, Informal Wills:
From Soldiers to Citizens, 5 ADEL. L. REV. 382 (1976).
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instruments.2 9 Circumstantial and other extrinsic evidence shed light
on the meaning of the document and the ambiguity is resolved in ac-
cordance with that evidence.30 In the case of unambiguous wills, on
the other hand, general principles of construction will not allow for
remedy because, by definition, the meaning of the will is clear when
read in light of surrounding circumstances.3 1 If, nevertheless, error is
alleged or apparent, the remedy of reformation would be required to
change the document so that it conforms to the actual intent of the
testator.3
2
Unambiguous wills alleged to contain a mistake present a difficult
dilemma. If the will does in fact contain a mistake, then failure to
correct it will defeat realization of testamentary wishes. On the other
hand, permitting extrinsic evidence to override the terms of an unam-
biguous will reduces the testator's control over the presentation of his
dispositive wishes and therefore creates the possibility that his at-
tempt to exercise testamentary freedom will fail through no fault of
his own. Whether reformation of unambiguous wills is appropriate
depends upon the extent to which there is confidence in the ability to
convey wishes accurately in written form and the extent to which
there is fear of undermining a will through the use of possibly unrelia-
ble extrinsic evidence.
29. See WLiAm BowE & DONALD PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF Wis § 32.1 (W. H.
Anderson, rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS].
30. The law of construction was not always so accommodating of extrinsic evidence.
For example, the plain meaning rule, now "largely discredited," was applied to
preclude introduction of extrinsic evidence where the will seemingly was clear on
its face. TH=i RESTATEMENT § 12.1 cmt. d; see also 9 WMoRE ON EVIDENCE
§ 2641 (3d ed. 1940); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 242 cmt. c (1940) (discussing the
reading of the instrument as a whole); PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 29, § 32.10;
Andrea W. Cornelison, Note, Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen?
The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 811 (2001).
Another means of limiting the introduction of extrinsic evidence in construction
proceedings was to distinguish between patent ambiguities, those discernable
from the face of the will, and latent ambiguities, which could be uncovered only
by reference to extrinsic evidence. Historically, extrinsic evidence was allowed
only to resolve latent ambiguities, see, e.g., Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886),
but this restriction was heavily criticized. See J.AEs B. THAYER, A PRELINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COlmnsON LAw 422 (Boston, Little Brown & Co.
1898); WmoMRE, supra, § 2472; REsTATEmENT OF PROP., supra, § 241 cmt. a;
Comment, Ascertaining the Testator's Intent: Liberal Admission of Extrinsic Evi-
dence, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1349 (1971). Some courts, however, continue to preclude
extrinsic evidence in the case of ambiguities characterized as patent. See, e.g.,
Breckner v. Prestwood, 600 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (precluding direct evi-
dence of intent due to characterization of ambiguity as patent but expressing dis-
satisfaction with the restriction); Bob Jones Univ. v. Strandell, 543 S.E.2d 251
(S.C. Ct. App. 2001); In re Estate of Burchfiel v. First United Methodist Church,
933 S.W.2d 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
31. See THIRD RESTATEMENT § 12.1 cmt. d.




A. Alternative Approaches to Reformation
Conceivable approaches to discerning testamentary intent range
from establishment of irrebuttable presumptions about dispositive
wishes for all decedents to a process of individualized determination
based on comprehensive review of any and all evidence of intent re-
gardless of the existence or absence of a will. Neither has been sug-
gested because the first effectively dispenses with testamentary
freedom by imposing an intestacy scheme on all decedents while the
second would impose an enormous administrative burden that would
be unjustified for those decedents who in fact formulated no testamen-
tary wishes. Several possibilities between these endpoints exist which
balance the benefits of correcting apparent errors against the costs of
doing so. The three approaches considered here, the historic ap-
proach, the approach adopted by the Third Restatement,33 and the ap-
proach advocated by Professor Fellows,3 4 are representative of the
advantages and disadvantages of seeking testamentary intent
through alternative means.
1. Historic Approach
The historic approach to reformation couples a rigid deference 3 5 to
the testator's unambiguously expressed written wishes with an elabo-
rate system of default rules that supplement or supersede provisions
of the will that appear to be the product of mistake stemming from the
testator's failure to anticipate circumstances as they exist at his
death.36 Examples of situations covered by such statutes 37 include
33. See supra note 9. The approach adopted by the Third Restatement largely re-
flects the views expressed by Professors Langbein and Waggoner in their ground-
breaking work on testamentary mistake. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change in the Direc-
tion of American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
34. See supra note 15.
35. Deference to the will as written, though rigid, is not absolute. Obligations to pay
taxes, satisfy creditors and provide for a surviving spouse all limit testamentary
freedom. See LEwIs M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND, THoMAs Coo-
LEY LECTURES, SIXTH SERIES 4-5 (1955). Additional mandates to provide for fam-
ily members other than the surviving spouse have been suggested. See, e.g.,
Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 1197 (1990) (advocat-
ing protection for children); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern
Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 121-133 (1994) (arguing in favor of recogni-
tion of posthumous support obligation for minor children); Ronald Chester,
Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32 REAL PROP.
PROB. & Ta. J. 405 (1997) (arguing in favor of a family maintenance scheme pat-
terned on that of British Columbia); see also Edwin M. Epstein, Testamentary
Capacity, Reasonableness and Family Maintenance: A Proposal for Meaningful
Reform, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 231 (1962) (arguing that a family maintenance scheme
would bring coherence to the doctrine of testamentary capacity).
36. The no-reformation rule was a fixture in English as well as American law until
1982 when England, by statute, adopted a reform similar to that adopted by the
[Vol. 80:387
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the death of a beneficiary prior to the testator,38 ineffective disposition
of all or a portion of the residuary estate, 3 9 and inadequacy of the es-
tate to fund all of the dispositions provided in the will.40 These stat-
utes presume that wills containing specified provisions or executed in
specified circumstances include a particular mistake and provide a
pre-established remedy. In all cases, however, the testator may avoid
application of the default rule by expressly addressing the contingency
contemplated by the corrective statute.
For example, anti-lapse statutes designate substitute beneficiaries
to receive bequests given to specified relatives of the testator who pre-
decease him.41 Without these statutes, such bequests would be inef-
fective, and the property given to the predeceased relative would fall
Third Restatement. Eng. Admin. of Justice Act, 1982, § 20, reprinted in THIRD
RESTATEMENT, Stat. Note 1, at 126-127 (providing that ifa court is satisfied that a
will is so expressed that it fails to carry out the testators intentions, in conse-
quence (a) of a clerical error, or (b) of a failure to understand his instructions, it
may order that the will shall be rectified so as to carry out his intentions). Simi-
lar statutes have been adopted in Australia. See AusTL. CAP. TEaR. WLS
(Amendment) ACT § 12A, No. 67, 1991, reprinted in ThucD RESTATEMENT, Stat.
Note 1, at 127 (providing that a will may be rectified to conform to the probable
intent of the testator); Wills Prob. and Admin. Act 1989 (N.S.W.) § 29A, reprinted
in THiRD RESTATEMENT, Stat. Note 1, at 128 (providing that wills may be rectified
so as to carry out the testator's intentions).
37. In addition to the examples in the text, several other corrective statutes exist.
See, e.g., Ux'mF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302, 8 U.LA 135-36 (1998) (failure to provide
for issue born after execution of the will); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301, 8 U.L..
133 (1998) (failure to provide for spouse whom testator married after execution of
the will); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804, 8 U.LA. 217-19 (1998) (failure to delete
provisions for spouse whom testator divorced after execution of the will); UNF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-903, 8 U.LA 234 (1998) (allowing reformation ofwils to cor-
rect perpetuities violations in a manner that approximates the testator's plan of
distribution in certain circumstances). Older statutes remedying perpetuities vi-
olations took a more restrictive approach by construing the instrument in a man-
ner that would obviate specified classic perpetuities violations. See, e.g., N.Y.
EST. PowERs & TRUST LAw § 9-1.3 (McKinney 1992) (presuming that dispositions
to widows refer to persons alive at the time the perpetuities clock begins to run;
dispositions involving age contingencies beyond 21 were intended to extend only
for the maximum period allowed by the rule; dispositions involving administra-
tive contingencies will be resolved within 21 years; and child-bearing capabilities
exist only within specified ages). Georgia has a unique mistake statute which
provides: "A will executed under a mistake of fact as to the existence or conduct of
an heir at law of the testator is inoperative insofar as such heir at law is con-
cerned, and the testator shall be deemed to have died intestate as to him." GA.
CODE AmN. § 53-2-8 (1997).
38. See, e.g., UNnF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603, 8 U.LA. 164-66 (1998).
39. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(b), 8 U.LA 174 (1998). The residuary es-
tate is the balance of the estate remaining after payment of all estate obligations
and dispositions under the will of fixed amounts or specific property. PAGE ON
WmLs, supra note 29, § 48.10.
40. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902, 8 U.LA. 268 (1998).
41. THom\s E. ATEINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF WnLs § 140 (2d ed. 1953). For a
comprehensive overview of issues that arise under anti-lapse statutes, see Susan
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into the residuary estate unless the will directed a different disposi-
tion. These statutes are based on the assumption that the testator
would have provided an alternative bequest to the substitute takers
identified in the statute, typically the issue of the deceased benefici-
ary, if he had considered the possibility that he would survive the rela-
tive-beneficiary. 42 If the testator does contemplate this possibility
and desires a disposition other than the one provided by the anti-lapse
statute, he may effectuate his intent by expressly identifying alterna-
tive takers or otherwise indicating an intent to avoid application of the
anti-lapse statute.43
Statutes designed to address ineffective disposition of a portion of
the residuary estate operate similarly. At common law, an ineffective
disposition of the residuary estate would pass to intestate takers
under the "no residue of a residue rule," which held that ineffective
residuary dispositions do not pass to other residuary beneficiaries on
the grounds that the property has passed to the residue once and can-
not pass through it again. 44 Thus, if the will provided one-third of the
residue to each of three friends, and one predeceased the testator, the
portion of the residue designated for the predeceased beneficiary
would pass in intestacy. Based on the assumption that most testators
would prefer the named residuary beneficiaries to intestate takers not
designated in the will, most jurisdictions reverse the no residue of a
residue rule, either by statute or by judicial decision, and hold that the
ineffectively disposed of portion passes to the remaining residuary
beneficiaries pro rata. As with anti-lapse statutes, the testator may
avoid this result by expressly providing an alternative disposition in
the event a residuary beneficiary predeceases.
As a final example, abatement statutes address the situation in
which the estate is inadequate to fund all of the dispositions provided
in the will. These statutes prioritize bequests by type, typically resid-
uary, 45 general, 46 demonstrative,47 and specific, 48 and provide that
F. French, Antilapse Statutes are Blunt Instruments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 335, 345 (1985).
42. French, supra note 41, at 337-40.
43. Id.
44. See PAGE ON WILLs, supra note 29, § 33.56.
45. A residuary devise, usually the last provision in the will incorporating language
like "residuum," "remainder," or "residue," disposes of all property remaining af-
ter payment of debts, expenses, and specific, demonstrative and general devises.
Id. § 48.10.
46. A general devise is "one which, in accordance with the terms of the will, may be
satisfied out of the testator's estate generally, by delivering all of his estate or
part of it which corresponds with the.., devise in general description, and which
is not charged upon any specific property." Id. § 48.2.
47. A demonstrative devise is a hybrid of the specific devise and the general devise.
It is a money gift, payable out of the estate generally but charged on a specific
fund. Id. § 48.7.
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they abate in that or a similar order, with bequests within a single
class abating pro rata.49 Like the preceding corrective statutes dis-
cussed, the statutory abatement scheme may be avoided by dictating
an alternative prioritization.
This approach to mistake provides protection against the most
common mistakes without depriving the testator of the ability to dis-
tribute his property in a manner inconsistent with the presumptions
underlying the corrective statutes. More liberalized relief from mis-
take based on analysis of extrinsic evidence of intent is generally un-
available under the historic approach. 50 Occasionally, this result is
expressed as a necessary corollary of the writing requirement of the
Statute of Wills as if there were no independent policy justifying this
interpretation of the statute.5 1 In reality, the preclusion against ref-
ormation is a purposive interpretation of the statute that reflects the
difficulty of discerning testamentary intent accurately from evidence
other than the will itself and thus advances the statute's evidentiary
function 52 to assure the testator that his unambiguously expressed
dispositive wishes will be respected.53
48. A specific devise is a gift of property which is in existence when the will is made
and which is described so that it can be distinguished from any other item of
property. Id. § 48.4. A devise of a dollar amount typically would not constitute a
specific devise but a devise of a particular stock or account may constitute a spe-
cific devise. Id. § 48.5.
49. See, e.g., UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902, 8 U.LA._ 268 (1998).
50. See, e.g., Burnett v. First Commercial Trust Co., 939 S.W.2d 827 (Ark. 1997) (re-
fusing to reform will to avoid intestate distribution); In re Estate of Smith, 599
N.E.2d 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that reformation should not be granted
under the guise of construction); Scarlett v. Hopper, 823 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that will cannot be reformed based on allegation of scrivener's er-
ror); In re Estate of Patrick, 728 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sur. Ct. 2001) (refusing to reform
will based on alleged mistake in the inducement).
51. See, e.g., Goode v. Goode, 22 Mo. 518, 522 (1856) ("[W]e hesitate not to declare
that [a proceeding to correct a mistake in a will] cannot be allowed or sustained
.... Admit this doctrine, and you may as well repeal the statute requiring wills to
be in writing at once. Witnesses will then make the wills and not testators.").
52. See supra note 22.
53. See, e.g., In re Will of Gluckman, 101 A. 295, 296 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1917) ("It is
more important that the probate of the wills of dead people be effectively shielded
from the attacks of a multitude of fictitious mistakes than that it be purged of
wills containing a few real ones. The latter a testator may, by due care, avoid in
his lifetime. Against the former he would be helpless."). See also Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 33, at 528 (arguing that courts are less serious about the
evidentiary problem than about the problem of technical Wills Act compliance).
The potentially enormous cost of reforming unambiguous wills alleged to contain
errors also is offered as a justification for the historic approach. See, e.g., Flan-
nery v McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 2000). Arguments historically justify-
ing the prohibition on reformation but no longer relied upon include: (1) the view
that reformation would constitute a collateral attack on the decree of the probate
court, and (2) the view that reformation is in the nature of specific performance
and requires consideration for its support which is lacking in the relationship
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While the vast majority of courts ostensibly adhere to the tradi-
tional proscription against reformation, many have deviated from it in
cases where the rationale of the rule appears to be inapplicable. The
deviation occurs both for categories of cases 5 4 and for individual cases
that seemingly are outside the realm of relief.55 This liberalized inter-
pretation of the historic approach is beneficial in the sense that it is
purposive rather than formalistic, but it also is problematic in the
sense that the deviations from it are not explicable by any generally
accepted theory.
On the spectrum of rules and standards,56 the historic approach to
reformation may be characterized as quite rule-oriented, meaning
that a predetermined directive, in this case effectuating intent in ac-
cordance with unambiguously expressed written wishes, will govern
disposition of the case regardless of particular facts and circumstances
demonstrable through extrinsic evidence tending to show that the
written words do not accurately reflect intent.5 7 As is typical of rules,
between a testator and beneficiary. G. THoMpsON, THE LAW OF WILLS § 137 (3d
ed. 1947).
54. On a systemic basis, relief from unambiguous mistakes is provided for several
classes of cases where the decedent's intent is thought to be unquestionable.
These include cases within the gifts by implication doctrine, see infra note 229;
violations of the rule against perpetuities, see infra notes 99-106; and tax-related
mistakes, see infra notes 109-113.
55. On an ad hoc basis, relief from the unambiguous mistake may be provided by
characterizing the error in question as an ambiguity, thus skirting the prohibi-
tion on reformation and justifying the remedy of construction. For example, the
cases on which illustrations 3, 5, 6 and 7 are based were characterized, either by
one or more of the parties or by the court itself, as matters of construction. See
also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, at 553 (arguing that courts mis-char-
acterize unambiguous wills as ambiguous in order to afford a remedy for clear
mistakes); PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 29, § 32.1.
56. For an overview of the debate about the relative merits of rules versus standards,
see Sunstein, supra note 18; RICiHAU A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COAILEX
WORLD (1995); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, A PHILOSOPHICAL Ex-
AMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAw AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992).
57. Rule-oriented approaches have been summarized as follows:
A legal directive is "rule"-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond
in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules
aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary
and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere.... A rule nec-
essarily captures the background principle or policy incompletely and so
produces errors of over or underinclusiveness. But the rule's force as a
rule is that decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the
background principle or policy to the facts would produce a different
result.
Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58.
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the no-reformation rule sometimes fails to achieve correct results be-
cause the rule is predicated on a generalization (the unambiguous
written will of the testator is the best indicator of testamentary intent)
that does not hold true in every case.5 8 Consequently, the rule, if
faithfully applied, will produce intent-defeating results in some
cases.59 Despite this quite obvious and important flaw, the no-refor-
mation rule, like any other rule, nevertheless may be supported due to
other advantages rules arguably enjoy over standards-oriented
approaches.
One of the most important advantages of a rule in the context of
will reformation is that it limits the opportunity to exercise bias by
finding evidence of "mistake" more readily in cases involving testators
whose dispositive plans are unusual or unpalatable.60 By limiting
courts to the unambiguous language of the will, these testators receive
assurance that their wishes will not be overturned because they are
unpopular. More generally, the rule-oriented approach offers predict-
ability to all testators, assuring them that their wishes, if expressed
unambiguously, will be respected.61 Furthermore, the no-reformation
rule reduces the cost of decision-making by effectively eliminating liti-
gation over all wills deemed to be unambiguous.62
For all of these reasons, the historic approach has more to com-
mend it than mere unthinking adherence to tradition. Nevertheless,
the steady stream of wills containing unremediable mistakes compels
58. SC HAUER, supra note 56, at 47-52.
59. Occasionally, corrective statutes, which are intended to remedy mistake, are the
cause of intent-defeating results. See, e.g., Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92
(Conn. 1998); Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892 (N.J. 1977).
60. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 974-75. In the context of donative transfers, this dis-
crimination takes the form of application of a "family preference" pursuant to
which "closer" relatives of the testator receive de facto advantage over the more
distant relatives or non-relatives. For development of this point, see infra notes
138-142, 146-48, 162-68, 173-180, and accompanying text.
61. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 976. For development of this point, see infra notes
196-203 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 972-74. For development of this point, see infra notes 216-17 and accompa-
nying text. In addition to the virtues of rules discussed in the text, rule advocates
identify the following virtues: (1) rules make it easier for adjudicators to enforce
determinations because they can claim that enforcement is dictated by those who
have laid down the rule; (2) rules increase accountability by clearly identifying
the body responsible (the creator of the rule-e.g., the legislature) if rules pro-
duce undesirable results; (3) rules avoid the humiliation of subjecting people to
exercises of official discretion in their particular case which may be important
where the determination would have a stigmatizing effect; and (4) rules promote
equal application of the law by treating the wealthy, who have the resources to
litigate disputes, similarly to those of modest means who would not have the abil-
ity to seek an individualized circumstanced adjudication. See id. at 969-978.
Professor Sunstein, himself not an advocate of rules, describes how the attributes
of rules characterized as advantages by rules proponents may be seen differently
by proponents of discretion-conferring approaches. See id. at 980-1003.
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consideration of alternative approaches that might better effectuate
intent.
2. Fellows Approach
The approach to reformation advocated by Professor Fellows seeks
to broaden the availability of the reformation remedy to eliminate the
cases in which the historic approach produces an outcome at odds with
common sense. This approach to reformation relaxes, indeed rejects,
the premise that the written will is an effective means by which a
typical testator can convey his testamentary wishes. The basis for re-
jecting the written word as an accurate expression of intent is the as-
sertion that "the level of detail and the economic constraints of the
planning process make it impossible for the property owner to under-
stand, let alone make an informed choice about, all the issues that
arise."6 3 The terms of a will drafted by a lawyer thus "do not reflect
the property owner's understanding of the plan" but rather, at best,
"implement a plan that represents the client's probable intent."64
This premise compels the conclusion that no will, however clear,
should be insulated from the possibility of revision based on judicial
determination of the testator's true intent.
At the same time, the premise precludes the conclusion that actual
intent of a particular testator is discernible; indeed, the premise would
suggest that it often is non-existent. Consequently, Fellows rejects
the goal of ascertaining actual intent as an unattainable ideal,
whether through extrinsic evidence or otherwise, and instead advo-
cates an approach in which determination of the meaning of a will is
acknowledged as a process of imputing intent to the testator based
upon evidence relating to the individual situation ("individualized im-
puted intent") or based upon general preferences that most testators
are deemed to have ("generalized imputed intent). 6 5 Generalized im-
puted intent would reflect the inclination of most testators to favor
family members and to engage in tax-efficient and otherwise sound
estate planning.66
Under this approach, alleged mistakes as well as ambiguities
would be resolved by presuming that the testator intended to benefit
his family and that he intended to minimize estate taxes. In other
63. Fellows, supra note 15, at 634.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Accord James L. Robertson, supra note 14, at 1052 ("We need to accept the
reality that the donor's subjective individuated intent may not be known with
sufficient certainty and completeness and frequency that we may successfully
ground it in our jurisprudence of donative documents."). Robertson's "circum-
stanced external approach" to interpretation of donative documents bears impor-
tant similarities to Fellows' approach but differs in significant respects. Id.
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words, reformation would be permitted based upon a court's view of
the merits of an estate plan even in the absence of specific evidence of
mistake. This approach, Fellows argues, better effectuates intent for
testators as a whole.
This approach represents a move away from the rule-oriented de-
termination embodied by the historic approach toward a standard-ori-
ented determination that permits consideration of the particulars of
individual cases.6 7 The approach is not, however, entirely devoid of
rule-like aspects. Generalized imputed intent, and to a lesser degree
individualized imputed intent, reflect presumptions (rebuttable rules)
about the dispositive choices of individuals. With sufficient evidence,
the presumptions can be overcome, but in the absence of such evidence
the rebuttable rules govern. Ultimately, this approach produces the
theoretical possibility of effectuating intent in all cases, but the price
of that benefit is introduction of prejudice produced by application of
presumptions derived from majoritarian norms.
68
3. Third Restatement Approach
The assumptions underlying the Third Restatement approach bear
some similarity to each of the approaches discussed thus far. Like the
historic approach, the Third Restatement is premised on the supposi-
tion that it is possible for testators to express themselves unambigu-
ously and the belief that testators who manage to do so should not
bear an undue risk that their wishes will be violated. At the same
time, the Third Restatement, like the Fellows approach, contemplates
the possibility of mistake and considers extrinsic evidence a useful
source of guidance about intent though, unlike the Fellows approach,
the Third Restatement seeks the actual (as opposed to imputed) intent
of the testator. The Third Restatement treats tax-related errors under
a special, more lenient provision that affords the remedy of "modifica-
tion" rather than "reformation" the chief benefit of which is that evi-
dentiary restrictions are loosened.
Under the general reformation provision of the Third Restatement:
67. A standard-like approach has been summarized as follows:
A legal directive is "standard-likeP when it tends to collapse decision-
making back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for the decrease of errors of
under and over inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discre-
tion than do rules.... Thus, the application of a standard in one case
ties the decisionmaker's hand in the next case less than does a rule-the
more facts one may take into account, the more likely that some of them
will be different the next time.
Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58-59 (internal citations omitted).
68. Fellows acknowledges the adverse impact generalized imputed intent may have
on testators with preferences outside majoritarian norms. Fellows, supra note
15, at 613 ([I]mputing intent... rais[es] barriers to donative freedom, while only
rarely prohibiting its exercise").
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A donative document, though unambiguous, may be reformed to conform the
text to the donor's intention if the following are established by clear and con-
vincing evidence:
(1) that a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement,
affected specific terms of the document; and
(2) what the donor's intention was.
Direct evidence of intention contradicting the plain meaning of the text as
well as other evidence of intention may be considered in determining whether
elements (1) and (2) have been established by clear and convincing
evidence.6 9
This provision allows for correction of a wide range of mistakes
that traditionally would be irremediable but imposes prerequisites to
the invocation of the remedy of reformation. One such threshold is
that the testator must execute a document conforming to the applica-
ble execution requirements. If the testator fails to execute a document
on the mistaken assumption that no will is required, for example, the
remedy of reformation is unavailable to correct this mistake.70 Addi-
tionally, the mistake must exist at the time of the execution. A failure
to change a will to reflect an unanticipated change in circumstances
cannot be remedied under this provision. 7 1
The proof requirements of the Third Restatement approach also im-
pose limitations on the situations in which a remedy may be available.
Under the general provision cited above, much importance is placed
on the requirement that evidence of intent must be "clear and convinc-
ing" to justify departure from the testator's unambiguously expressed
wishes.72 The rationale is that the above-normal standard of proof
will guard against giving effect to fraudulent or mistaken evidence
and yet allow remedy in cases where the evidence is genuine and per-
suasive.73 The higher standard of proof also is intended to impose a
heightened sense of responsibility upon the trial judge and to free ap-
pellate courts to scrutinize the trial court's work more closely than in
the typical preponderance of the evidence review.7 4 Finally, it is
thought that the higher standard of proof will deter a potential plain-
tiff from bringing a reformation suit on the basis of insubstantial
evidence. 75
Another restriction on the use of extrinsic evidence to support ref-
ormation is that the alleged mistake, as well as the proof of the testa-
69. THiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.1. This provision, phrased in terms of the
"donative document" and the "donor's intent," applies to inter vivos instruments
as well as wills. Adoption of a single standard to govern reformation of both types
of instruments is an important, though not indispensable, virtue of a reformation
doctrine for donative transfers. See infra notes 260-272 and accompanying text.
70. THiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.1 cmt. h.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 12.1 cmt. e.
73. Id. § 12.1 cmt. b.
74. Id. § 12.1 cmt. e.
75. Id.
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tor's actual intent, must be established by particularized proof.76 This
requirement of particularity is designed to preclude reformation based
on generalized claims such as, "if only my aunt had known how much I
loved her, she would have left me more."7 7 Similarly, an assertion
that the testator sought an estate plan to minimize taxes would lack
the particularity required to justify a reformation under this stan-
dard.78 This focus on proof with particularity constitutes a rejection of
Fellows' generalized imputed intent approach and instead requires
specific evidence about the dispositive desires of the testator.
Discerning how these evidentiary standards will apply to actual
cases is difficult because the Third Restatement illustrations indicate
only the nature of the mistakes that are within the ambit of the provi-
sion and not the combinations of evidence that will satisfy the proof
requirements.7 9 To a degree, the nature of the proof required will de-
pend upon the particular facts of the case, the credibility of witnesses,
and other matters that are situation specific. There are, however,
general evidentiary questions that arise under such a broad provision.
For example, should circumstantial evidence alone ever support refor-
mation? The Third Restatement does not directly preclude this,S0 but
on the other hand, circumstantial evidence alone would seem to fall
short of the requirement to establish mistake with particularized
proof because circumstantial evidence establishes no more than that
the testator's dispositive plan fails to comport with the wishes the
finder of fact would expect of someone similarly situated. Another
general question is whether the drafter's testimony alone may satisfy
the clear and convincing standard. Professors Langbein and Wag-
goner, on whose work the Third Restatement position is premised,
opine that it should not in the usual case,8 ' but nothing in the Third
Restatement suggests either support for or rejection of that position.
These evidentiary questions do not arise in the case of tax mistakes
that fall within the Third Restatement's special modification provi-
sion. Under this provision, a will that fails to qualify for a tax benefit
the testator intended to take advantage of may be re-written "in a
manner that does not violate the donor's probable intention, to achieve
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. In this type of case, the remedy of modification might be available. See infra
notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
79. Tamp RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.1 cmt. i, illus. 4-8 (indicating that mis-
takes will be remediable if the evidence satisfies the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof but failing to illustrate what such evidence might be).
80. THID RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.1. But see infra note 95 (Third Restate-
ment's definition of ambiguity suggests that where circumstantial evidence alone
suggests mistake the case may be classified as one meriting construction rather
than justifying reformation).
81. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, at 588 (noting that burden of proof in refor-
mation is too high for the lawyer to carry unaided in most cases).
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the donor's tax objectives."82 This does not require a showing that the
testator's original, particularized intention was not expressed but
rather merely a showing, based on a preponderance of the evidence,
that the testator's tax objectives were not achieved.83 Satisfying this
standard requires a determination of the testator's non-tax as well as
tax objectives. Where a tax savings can be achieved with no disposi-
tive alteration, for example by dividing a single trust into multiple
trusts in order to maximize the value of tax exemptions or deduc-
tions,8 4 the test is satisfied.S5 On the other hand, if the tax savings
requires an alteration of the beneficial interests, a factual inquiry into
the testator's intent is necessary. Such inquiry includes consideration
of the testator's dispostive plan as well as the consent of detrimentally
affected beneficiaries.86
This standard embodies elements of Fellows' concept of generalized
imputed intent with respect to tax-related planning. Unlike Fellows'
approach, the Third Restatement does not begin with the presumption
that the testator intended to avail himself of all advantageous estate
planning techniques and instead requires a finding that the testator
in fact intended to achieve tax benefits. Once this intent is demon-
strated, however, the Third Restatement approach parallels the Fel-
lows approach to the extent that changes necessary to accomplish the
tax objective are authorized even without additional affirmative proof
they advance the testator's desires so long as the changes are not in-
consistent with those desires.
The Third Restatement approach to tax mistakes will be less ac-
commodating than the Fellows approach for testators who did not con-
sider tax objectives during the planning process. On the other hand, it
has the potential to be more accommodating than the historic ap-
proach to the extent that the will itself fails to manifest the testator's
objectives.8 7
82. THiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.2.
83. Id. § 12.2 cmt. c.
84. Simple division of a single trust into multiple trusts increases the tax efficiency of
a plan where only a portion of the assets will be subject to transfer tax at a later
time. Segregating the assets into one trust that is fully taxable and one that is
fully exempt from later tax allows the beneficiaries to consume the taxable assets
while preserving the tax exempt assets. For examples of cases involving this type
of reformation, see In re Estate of Reese, 622 So. 2d 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
In re Case, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Surr. Ct. 1992); In re Nossiter, 552 N.Y.S.2d 834
(Surr. Ct. 1990); In re Kaskel, 549 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Surr. Ct. 1989). Some states
now permit such reformations by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRusTS
LAw § 7-1.13 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2001).
85. THiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.2 cmt. f.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Conn. Bank and Trust Co. v. Ajello, 468 A.2d 942 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1983) (refusing to reform trust to qualify it as tax exempt despite absence of ob-
jection by any interested party); In re Branigan, 609 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1992) (declin-
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On the spectrum of rules and standards, the Third Restatement is
rule-like in the sense that it imposes thresholds to qualify for reforma-
tion relief.88 Its core, however, is a standard that affords wider discre-
tion than does the Fellows approach. Rather than anchoring
presumptions about dispositive choices to imputed intent as Fellows
does, the Third Restatement authorizes an unconstrained individual-
ized inquiry into actual intent. The modification provision applicable
to tax errors does contain some element of imputed intent to the ex-
tent that it shifts the burden of proof to those who support adherence
to the terms of the document once a general desire to secure a tax
benefit has been proven. However, the modification provision does not
adopt the presumption of Fellows that all testators intend to minimize
taxes.
The Third Restatement's focus on actual, rather than imputed, in-
tent ostensibly frees the inquiry from the inherent bias toward
majoritarian norms that the Fellows approach incorporates. To the
extent the bias is absent, the results produced by the Third Restate-
ment ]vi1 be more likely to effectuate actual intent of testators who
deviate from those norms. Whether it is possible to free the intent
inquiry from those biases is another question. Evaluation of evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, may be influenced indirectly or uncon-
sciously by the fact finder's sense of what a similarly situated individ-
ual would wish. At bottom, the Third Restatement's rejection of
imputed intent will increase the unpredictability of results without
necessarily eliminating the bias that makes its use so troublesome.8 9
B. Seven Classic Mistake Cases
The preceding description of alternative approaches to reformation
identifies abstractly the relative strengths and weaknesses of each,
which is a useful preliminary step in the process of evaluating possible
alternatives. This section illustrates the meaning and import of the
abstractions by applying the alternative approaches to seven classic
mistake cases.
These cases, organized in order of seeming clarity of intent, high-
light three important points. First, there are cases (e.g., Cases 1 and
2) in which the will itself establishes with certainty that adherence to
its terms defeats the intent expressed within it. Second, in cases
ing to reform will in a manner that would alter dispositive provisions in order to
achieve a tax benefit); In re Burkett, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 7, 1997, at 27, col. 4 (Surr. Ct.)
(refusing to reform dispositions to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction
where the document failed to indicate an intent to secure the deduction despite
the consent of all beneficiaries).
88. See supra notes 70-72 and 76-78.




where the will itself does not manifest mistake (e.g., Cases 3, 4 and 5),
consideration of extrinsic evidence risks defeating testamentary in-
tent, and this risk varies depending upon the type of evidence in-
volved. Finally, evidentiary restrictions cannot preclude the implicit
role of the family preference in the process of discerning intent (e.g.,
Cases 5, 6 and 7).
1. Case 1: The Crossed Will Execution9O-An Unequivocal Error
Husband and wife wish to execute mutual (mirror image) wills. The wills are
prepared properly, and husband and wife sign the wills in execution ceremo-
nies conducted simultaneously. Inadvertently, husband signs the will pre-
pared for his wife, and wife signs the will prepared for her husband.
Query: May the will signed by the husband be admitted to probate
and then reformed so that the document reads as if it were the instru-
ment prepared for the husband?
In the case of a crossed will execution where each spouse signs the
will prepared for the other, strict application of the Statute of Wills
would preclude relief. The will execution requirements, if strictly ap-
plied, foreclose probate of the will containing the testamentary provi-
sions the decedent intended to express; reformation of the erroneously
signed instrument is impermissible on the grounds that Case 1 is in-
distinguishable, in principle, from other cases involving less compel-
ling proof.9 '
Strict adherence to the no-reformation rule in this case is "ironic-
if not perverse."9 2 The will signed by the decedent itself manifests the
existence of the mistake-the testator named in the will is different
from the individual who signed it. Compelling evidence of the dece-
dent's dispositive intent is provided by the wills of the couple, consid-
ered together. The wills reveal a joint plan of disposition under which
each spouse leaves his or her own estate to the other, and at the death
of the survivor, leaves the estate to the same ultimate beneficiaries.
The documents, executed simultaneously, with all of the formalities
required for wills, are nearly as free of concerns about fraud and per-
jury as one properly executed will would be. Neither the testimony of
the drafter (or others) nor evaluation of the dispositive choices embod-
ied in the instruments is necessary to the conclusion that mistake oc-
curred. The will offered for probate itself establishes mistake with
absolute certainty unless the possibility that the couple purposefully
endeavored to achieve a nullity in their estate planning activities
must be considered.
In In re Snide, the New York Court of Appeals adopted this view,
granting relief in a crossed will execution case, while purporting to
90. This illustration is based on In re Snide, 418 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1981).
91. In re Estate of Pavlinko, 148 A.2d 528 (Pa. 1959).
92. 418 N.E.2d at 657.
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adhere to the historic approach to reformation. 93 This decision may
be understood as an unprincipled deviation from the no-reformation
rule, indistinguishable from any other situation in which the proof is
compelling. Alternatively, it may represent a limit in the scope of the
no-reformation rule. The rule, so conceived, requires adherence to the
unambiguous terms of a document only if the terms effectuate a dispo-
sition. If the terms of the will fail to effectuate a disposition, they can-
not be any, much less the best, source of the testator's dispositive
intent, and deference to the instrument is not required if extrinsic evi-
dence establishes dispositive intent with requisite certainty.9 4
Similarly, relief should be available under the Third Restatement
approach for the crossed will execution. Whether the appropriate
remedy would be reformation or construction, however, is unclear. Ar-
guably, an uncertainty in meaning is apparent from the will itself in
light of the discrepancy between the testator named in the will and
the signature of a different individual.95 On the other hand, the ab-
sence of any conflict in the dispositive terms themselves might suggest
that reformation is the appropriate remedy. If characterized as an
ambiguity, then the proof of dispositive wishes must be established by
a mere preponderance of the evidence.9 6 If characterized as an unam-
biguous mistake, then the proof must meet the higher clear and con-
vincing standard and the particularity requirements. 97  The
93. Id.
94. The Snide decision expressly refutes the argument that it creates a general ex-
ception to the no-reformation rule, but this may simply reflect the reality that
cases involving both certain mistake and high quality extrinsic evidence estab-
lishing testamentary intent will be exceedingly rare. See id.
95. The following illustration, categorized by the Third Restatement as ambiguous,
supports this contention:
G's will devised property to "my friend Richard H. Simpson." Extrinsic
evidence shows that "Richard H. Simpson," though a remote acquain-
tance, was not G's "friend," but another person with that surname, one
Hamilton Ross Simpson, also known as "Bill" or "Rotary Bill," was G's
friend.
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 11.2 cmt. j, illus. 7. To categorize this dispo-
sition as ambiguous, one must ascribe an artificially narrow meaning to the elas-
tic descriptor "friend." See AmEmRcAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 527 (William Morris ed. 1976) (defining "friend" to include any associ-
ate or acquaintance). The only reason to do so is to facilitate the opportunity to
change an otherwise unambiguous disposition on the grounds that the motivation
for the disposition is not readily apparent. If this justifies a finding of ambiguity,
then the facts of Case 1, where the motivation for the disposition could only be
mischief or mistake, should easily merit construction relief. But see infra note
107.
96. THRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 11.2 (stating that preponderance standard
of evidence applies to ambiguities).
97. THum RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.1 (stating that clear and convincing stan-
dard of evidence applies to unambiguous mistakes).
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compelling nature of the proof here easily satisfies either standard so
categorization makes little difference.
This, the clearest of all cases considered, is trouble-free from a pur-
posive perspective only because the error is one of execution rather
than one of substantive meaning. As such, the case is different from
true reformation cases which involve a failure to articulate intent ac-
curately in the will. Consequently, Case 1 is more appropriately char-
acterized as an execution error to be remedied by one of the
approaches under which signing formalities are relaxed.9 8
2. Case 2: The Bequest Void at Execution99 -Another
Unequivocal Error
Testator's will establishes two trusts, one for the benefit of his son and one for
the benefit of his daughter, which were to terminate upon the later of (i) the
death of the child for whose life benefit the trust was created, and (ii) the
attainment of age 35 by all of the testator's grandchildren. The remainder
interests in the trusts violate the rule against perpetuities, 1 0 0 requiring the
court to declare the future interests void in the absence of reformation.
Query: May the will be reformed to save the future interests in the
trust by modifying the provisions of the will to conform to the rule
against perpetuities?
The level of certainty about the existence of mistake is identical in
the case of a perpetuities violation and a crossed will execution. In
both, the conclusion may be erroneous only if the testator engaged in
the estate planning exercise intending to achieve a nullity. In the
crossed will execution case, the error obviates the will in its entirety
while the perpetuities error obviates the provisions of the will running
afoul of the perpetuities restrictions.
As with the crossed will execution cases, courts adhering to the no-
reformation rule have produced conflicting results in the perpetuities
cases. In some cases, courts have applied the rule strictly, refusing to
reform the will so that the provisions offending the rule against perpe-
tuities are simply struck from the will.1O1 To the extent that the no-
reformation rule is premised on a distrust for extrinsic evidence, re-
fusing to reform perpetuities violations conforms to the purpose of the
98. See supra notes 24-25.
99. This illustration is based on In re Ghiglia, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Ct. App. 1974).
100. The common law rule against perpetuities voids certain future interests that
neither vest nor fail to vest within a period measured by a life in being plus 21
years. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Ro-
land Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942). Because of its extraordinary complexity, the rule
has been described as "a modem labyrinth in need of a golden thread." Jesse
Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1867 (1986).
101. See, e.g., Merrill v. Wimmer, 481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985); Clayton J. Richardson
Trust, 634 A.2d 1005 (N.H. 1993); In re Shehan, 597 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Surr. Ct.
1993); Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Miglietta, 614 A.2d 1218 (R.I. 1992).
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rule. This distrust, however, extends only to unambiguous instru-
ments and not to ambiguous ones where, as noted earlier,O 2 extrinsic
evidence is freely considered. Once mistake is unequivocally estab-
lished, however, ambiguous and unambiguous mistakes are indistin-
guishable. In either situation, the testator's true intent is not
discernable from the will alone. Consequently, there is little justifica-
tion for restricting use of extrinsic evidence, for whatever it may be
worth, to ascertain intent.'
03
Recognizing the validity of this argument, some courts have re-
formed wills to comply with the perpetuities requirements while oth-
erwise adhering to the no-reformation rule. 0 4 In In re Ghiglia, for
example, upon which Case 2 is based, the court reduced the age con-
tingency for the grandchildren's remainder interests to 21 to conform
to the rule against perpetuities.' 0 5 In so holding, the court was able to
preserve the "dominant testamentary plan."
1 0 6
The Third Restatement approach would deny relief, either con-
struction or reformation, for this unequivocal error. The certainty
that the testator's expressed wishes cannot be effectuated is insuffi-
cient to merit remedy because the will, when written, accurately
stated the testator's actual, albeit unattainable, intent.1 o7 The exis-
102. See supra note 30.
103. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP), embodied in UNi-
FORN PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901 to 2-907, 8 U.L_.A 223 (1998 & Supp. 2001), is pre-
mised on this conclusion. Under USRAP, an instrument violating the rule
against perpetuities may be reformed "in the manner that most closely approxi-
mates the testator's manifested plan of distribution" subject to the requirement
for the interest to vest or fail within 90 years. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra, § 2-
903. There is little concern about the ability to discern the testator's intent in
these cases because the error is not a failure to express wishes accurately but
rather a failure to alter actual wishes to conform to legal constrains on disposi-
tions. See UNi. PROBATE CODE, official cmt., 8 U.L.A. 234, 235 (1998 & Supp.
2001); William M. McGovern, Facts and Rules in the Construction of Wills, 26
UCLA L. REv. 285, 310-25 (1978). The widespread popularity of this statute evi-
dences the common sense appeal of the reasoning underlying it. UNIF. STAT.
RULE AGAINST PERPETurI~s, 8B U.LA4. 223 (West 2001) (listing, as of 1999, 25
jurisdictions that have enacted the statute).
104. See, e.g., In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183 (Haw. 1970); Edgerly
v. Barker, 31 A. 900 (N.H. 1891).
105. 116 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
106. Id.
107. In response to a query from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York's
Committee on Trusts, Estates and Surrogate's Courts, Professors Langbein and
Waggoner expressed the view that perpetuities violations would be outside the
purview of the Third Restatement's reformation provisions in the absence of proof
that a "savings clause? (providing for termination of trusts no later than the max-
imum period permitted by the rule against perpetuities) was intended to be in-
serted but was omitted by drafting mistake. Letter from Langbein and Waggoner
to Donald A. Goldsmith and Professor Robert Parella (Feb. 26, 2000) (on file with
author). Upon further inquiry Professor Waggoner opined that the perpetuities
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tence of other statutory authority' 0 8 to remedy perpetuities violations
reduces concern about perpetuities problems in particular, but it is
unclear why any provision that is certain to fail to effectuate intent is
outside the purview of reformation.
3. Case 3: Tax Mistakes1O9--Red Apples, Green Apples, and
Oranges
Testator's will establishes a single trust for the benefit of his spouse and issue
of his siblings. Distributions from the trust to siblings' issue will incur gener-
ation-skipping tax (GSTT) to the extent the decedent's exemption from GSTT
is not applied to the trust. If, however, the trust is divided into two identical
trusts, the testator's GSTT exemption may be allocated to fully insulate one
trust from GSTT which will minimize total transfer taxes payable without
affecting the dispositive provisions of the will.1 1 0 All interested parties con-
sent to the proposed reformation.
Query: May the will be reformed?
The confluence of several factors has created a special niche for
tax-related testamentary mistakes in some jurisdictions. First, the
ever increasing complexity of federal transfer tax law magnifies the
potential for drafting error.' 1 ' Second, the concern about distrust of
violation should not qualify for relief either. Letter from Waggoner to the author
(Dec. 10, 2001) (on file with author).
108. See supra note 103.
109. This illustration is based on In re Dunlop, 617 N.Y.S. 2d 119 (Surr. Ct. 1994).
The disposition in Dunlop was somewhat more complex than that of Case 3 due
to the interplay of the unified credit applicable to transfer tax, the estate tax
marital deduction and the generation skipping transfer tax, but the more
simplistic facts of Case 3 accurately illustrate the issue involved.
110. For a description of the benefits of trust-splitting, see supra note 84.
111. For a sampling of recent cases in which reformation was sought to achieve tax
benefits, see Shawmut Bank, NA. v. Buckley, 665 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 1996); In re
Feder, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 2001, at 28, col. 3 (Surr. Ct.); In re Pollock, N.Y.L.J. Jan.
10, 2001, at 31, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.); In re Stern, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 2000, at 26, col. 1
(Surr. Ct.); In re White, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 2000, at 27, col. 5 (Surr. Ct.); In re
Meehan, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 2000, at 32, col. 3 (Surr. Ct.); In re Feldman, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 30, 1998, at 26, col. 4 (Surr. Ct.); In re Gelardin, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1998, at
24, col. 3 (Surr. Ct.); In re Amerman, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1998, at 25, col. 1 (Surr.
Ct.); In re Mulroy, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at 35, col. 4 (Surr. Ct.); In re Bruckner,
N.Y.L.J., July 15, 1997, at 30, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.); In re Sonik, N.Y.L.J., June 23,
1997, at 29, col. 1 (Surr. Ct.); In re Conlin, N.Y.L.J., Sept., 3, 1996, at 34, col. 2
(Surr. Ct.); In re Schmitt, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1996, at 35, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.); In re
Gutfreund, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1996, at 27, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.); In re Brown, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 8, 1995, at 32, col. 4 (Surr. Ct.); In re Acton, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1995, at 31, col.
5 (Surr. Ct.); see also THrim RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.2 reporters note 1
(collecting cases). When the dispositive instrument is a revocable trust rather
than a will, the Statute of Wills, of course, is inapplicable and therefore relief is
available. For a sampling of recent tax reformations involving revocable trusts,
see Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Mackey, 745 N.E.2d 943 (Mass. 2001); Walker v. Walker,
744 N.E.2d 60 (Mass. 2001); DiCarlo v. Mazzarella, 717 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 1999);
Fleet Bank, NA. v. Fleet Bank, NA., 706 N.E.2d 627 (Mass. 1999); Bank of Bos-
ton v. Marlow, 701 N.E.2d 304 (Mass. 1998); Putnam v. Putnam, 682 N.E.2d 1351
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extrinsic evidence is of marginal relevance because often it is uniquely
unequivocal. All interested parties will support the reformation if it
increases the benefits for all at the sole expense of the taxing authori-
ties; the taxing authorities very often acquiesce in the result; and all
but the most unusual of testators would agree with the reformation.
Moreover, the document itself often will manifest an intent to qualify
for the particular tax benefit at issue, so the remedy, though properly
characterized as reformation in the sense that an actual re-writing of
the instrument is required to qualify for the tax benefit, is really more
akin to construction in the sense that extrinsic evidence is relied upon
to clarify intent that is expressly set forth in the document itself.1 12
Finally, given that the Internal Revenue Code is not the native tongue
of the testator, there is no expectation that the testator has considered
the choice of language in light of the Code's requirements, and there-
fore, there is little hesitation in modifying the language to facilitate
the testator's apparent general purpose.
In Case 3, strict application of the historic approach would pre-
clude relief. In In re Dunlop, on which Case 3 is based, the court held
that reformation was unjustified because the will itself did not mani-
fest an intent to maximize the benefit of the generation-skipping
transfer tax exemption. 1 13 Although the failure to mention genera-
tion-skipping transfer taxes in the will supports the conclusion that
the testator did not contemplate minimizing them, it is almost un-
thinkable that he would object to a ministerial change increasing the
net estate while leaving the dispositive provisions entirely in tact. For
this reason, more progressive courts applying the historic approach
(Mass. 1997); Pond v. Pond, 678 N.E.2d 1321 (Mass. 1997); In re Merns, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 16, 2001, at 18, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.); In re Cappelli, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 29, 2000, at
28, col. 3 (Surr. Ct.); In re Gould, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at 29, col. 3 (Surr. Ct.);
In re Fidelman, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 2, 1999, at 35, col. 5 (Surr. Ct.); In re Flexner,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1999, at 29, col. 2 (Surr. Ct.); In re Rudin, N.Y.L.J. Aug, 27,
1999, at 33, col. 5 (Surr. Ct.); In re Giordano, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1998, at 29, col. 1
(Surr. Ct.); In re Bull, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 1998, at 33, col. 4 (Surr. Ct.); Griffin v.
Griffin, 832 P.2d 810 (Ok. 1992). See also Robinson v. Robinson, 720 So. 2d 540
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that the trial court had the duty to reform
testamentary aspects of the trust to correct a scrivenor's mistake to comply with
the intent of the testator).
112. See, e.g., Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 747 (Mass. 2000) (citing Put-
nam v. Putnam, 682 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1997)); In re Martin, 549 N.Y.S. 2d 592
(Surr. Ct. 1989). The modern trend in New York is to denominate the requested
relief as "construction and reformation." See, e.g., In re Jobson, 699 N.Y.S.2d 460
(App. Div. 1999); In re Dunlop, 617 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Surr. Ct. 1994); In re Case, 585
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Surr. Ct. 1992). See also In re Hughes, 631 N.Y.S.2d 900 (App.
Div. 1995) (non-tax case). This allows the applicant to seek the more extreme
relief while invoking the more relaxed standards of the universally accepted rem-
edy of construction.
113. 617 N.Y.S.2d at 123, overruled by N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUST LAW § 7-1.13 (Mc-
Kinney 1992 & Supp. 2001).
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would grant relief in similar cases1 1 4  as would the Third
Restatement.1 ' 5
Where achievement of the tax benefit requires modification of the
dispositive provisions as opposed to mere administrative change, con-
clusions about the testator's intent are less certain. These cases may
be divided into three categories: those in which the will indicates an
intent to qualify for the tax benefit it fails to achieve (red apples);1" 6
those in which the will does not indicate an intent to qualify for a par-
ticular tax benefit, but extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the testa-
tor intended to utilize that tax benefit (green apples);' 1 7 and those in
which the testator did not intend to utilize a tax benefit which some-
one argues he would have wanted if he had been properly advised
(oranges).' 8
Cases within the first category ought to fall within the ambit of
construction rather than reformation because the conflict between the
stated intent to qualify for a tax benefit and the failure of the will to so
qualify creates an ambiguity. Some cases applying the historic ap-
proach follow this analysis while others treat the issue as one of refor-
mation on the grounds that qualification for the tax benefit requires
actual re-writing of the will.119 Under the Third Restatement's modifi-
cation standard, the will's statement of the intent to achieve the tax
benefit in issue suffices so that a remedy is available regardless of
whether the will is characterized as ambiguous, thus meriting con-
struction relief, or not.12
0
114. See supra note 84.
115. See supra note 82.
116. See, e.g., In re Martin, 549 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Surr. Ct. 1989) (involving a testator's
will that expressly contemplated that a trust would qualify for the estate tax
marital deduction but permitted the trustee to sell trust assets at less than fair
market value which would preclude allowance of that deduction).
117. See, e.g., In re Quigan, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1994, at 34 col. 3 (Surr. Ct.) (involving a
will that established a trust insulated from further transfer tax by reason of the
unified credit ("credit shelter trust") over which testator's daughter was given
general power of appointment thereby subjecting the assets to tax in the daugh-
ter's estate; inclusion of credit shelter trust would not necessarily be inconsistent
with estate tax planning but drafter testified to error).
118. See, e.g., In re Choate, 533 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Surr. Ct. 1988) (involving provisions of
testamentary trust that required modification in order to minimize consequences
of generation-skipping transfer tax which was not in effect at the time will was
executed).
119. Compare In re Martin, 549 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Surr. Ct. 1989) (holding that will's indi-
cation of intent to qualify trust for estate tax marital deduction resulted in cate-
gorizing will as ambiguous), with In re Bickel, 598 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Surr. Ct. 1993)
(holding that presumed intent to qualify trust for estate tax charitable deduction
did not result in categorizing will as ambiguous). See also In re Estate of Reese,
622 So. 2d 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Edmisten v. Sands, 300 S.E.2d 387
(N.C. 1983) (holding that where realization of tax objectives requires change in
administrative provisions only, proper relief is construction).
120. See THmD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9.
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Cases in which the utilization of a tax benefit requires dispositive
modification and the will contains no clear indication of the desire to
achieve a particular tax benefit are more difficult to reconcile with the
historic approach. Whether the testator desired the benefit but failed
to express it in the will (green apples) or the testator failed to consider
the tax benefit but may have wanted it if he had considered it (or-
anges), there is no testamentary indication of this intent. Neverthe-
less, some courts applying the historic approach have entertained
applications of this sort on the grounds that the tax benefit may be
great in comparison to the disruption of the estate plan. In these
cases, some courts have tended to focus on what the testator would
have wanted in light of the tax laws existing at his death rather than
on what the testator actually desired at the time of will execution so
that "green apples" and "oranges" are treated like "red apples."1 21
The Third Restatement adopts this approach,1 2 2 falling short of Fel-
lows' concept of generalized imputed intent which affords all testators
the benefits of sound estate planning regardless of whether they con-
sidered tax issues in the development of their estate plans.' 2 3
Unlike Cases 1 and 2, the universe of possible motivations for exe-
cuting wills failing to qualify for tax benefits is not limited to mischief
or mistake. Even where no dispositive change is required to realize a
tax benefit, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that the testator intended
the results produced by the will as written. Where dispositive change
is required, the possibility that the testator desired the plan as writ-
ten becomes more realistic. Thus, in every case of alleged tax mistake,
the safe harbor may be important, and in those tax cases that involve
changes to the will's dispositive provisions, the safe harbor is as im-
portant as it is in any other situation where reformation affords the
opportunity to re-write dispositions.
4. Case 4: The Scriveners Error124-- Over-Reliance on Drafters'
Testimony
Testator executes a will establishing a charitable trust, and nine years later
executes a codicil to change the charitable beneficiaries. Six years after exe-
cuting the first codicil, testator executes a second codicil in order to qualify the
trust for the estate tax charitable deduction pursuant to newly enacted
changes in the Internal Revenue Code. In the preparation of the second codi-
cil, the lawyer inadvertently reinstates the charities named in the original
121. Compare In re Choate, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (involving testator who did not actu-
ally intend to achieve a particular tax benefit), with In re Quigan, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
17, 1994, at 34, col. 3 (Surr. Ct.) (involving testator who alleged to desire tax
benefit at the time of the will execution).
122. See THuD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9.
123. See Fellows, supra note 15.
124. This illustration is based on Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital, 448




will in place of the charities named in the first codicil thus dramatically
changing the decedent's estate plan. The decedent executed the second codi-
cil, and at his death it, together with the will and first codicil, is offered for
probate.
Query: May the will (second codicil) be reformed to provide that the
charities named in the first codicil take?
Case 4 differs from all of the preceding cases in that the alleged
error could not be suspected in the absence of the testimony of the
drafter. The will and codicils together establish a valid charitable
trust that qualifies for favorable tax treatment. The testamentary
documents disclose a change from one set of charitable beneficiaries to
another and back again, but this raises no suspicion of error; instead,
it simply appears that the testator vacillated about the charitable ben-
eficiaries. The testamentary plan can be carried out as written, and
nothing about the plan is at odds with expectations about what a tes-
tator in this position would do.
In such a case, application of the historic approach would preclude
relief which is the result reached in Connecticut Junior v. Sharon Hos-
pital,125 on which Case 4 is patterned. Even as it adhered to the no-
reformation rule, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, quoting the lower
court, hinted at possible justifications for excepting scriveners' errors
from the general reformation prohibition:
Substantial and convincing evidence was offered to establish that the testator
had directed that the second codicil to his will be prepared only for the pur-
pose of qualifying the charitable bequests under Paragraphs Seventh and
Eighth of the will and first codicil as charitable remainder annuity trusts eli-
gible for an estate tax charitable deduction in the decedent's estate; and that
by scrivener's error the [charities named in the will] were substituted for the
[charities named in the first codicil] in the [second] codicil; and that the pro-
posed [second] codicil was presented to the testator in the context of innocent
misrepresentation of its contents resulting in mistake in the instrument as
executed with respect as to which charitable beneficiaries the testator in-
tended to benefit.
1 2 6
Under the approach of the Third Restatement the case would rise
or fall on the testimony of the drafter.127 With or without supporting
direct proof, such as the testimony of the secretary or contemporane-
ous notes, the drafter's testimony seems compelling. Not only does he
forthrightly confess to the error, the circumstances support the expla-
nation that the testator executed the second codicil for the sole pur-
125. Id. Similar cases arise recurringly. See, e.g., In re Estate of Frietze, 966 P.2d 183
(N.M. 1998) (declining to correct alleged scrivener's error to replace one benefici-
ary with another); Scarlett v. Hopper, 823 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (declining
to correct alleged scrivener's error where the effect would be to change benefi-
ciaries that the will unambiguously identified). See also V. Woerner, Annotation,
Effect of Mistake of Draftsman (Other Than Testator) in Drawing Will, 90
A.L.R.2d 924 (1963 & Supp. 1993).
126. 448 A.2d at 192 n.5 (emphasis added).
127. TmRD REsTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.1 cmt. i, illustr. 4, 5, 6.
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pose of securing a tax advantage and not to effect any dispositive
change. There is no evidence contradicting the drafter's recollection
and no reason to doubt his veracity. To the contrary, it would seem
highly unlikely that the drafter would testify to an error he did not
commit. For those reasons, the testimony of the drafter alone, at least
in this case, arguably should satisfy the clear and convincing
standard.
The epilogue to Connecticut Junior proves this conclusion wrong.
Following the Connecticut Supreme Court's refusal to permit reforma-
tion of the will,' 28 the disappointed beneficiaries brought a malprac-
tice action against the drafter.' 2 9 In Connecticut Junior, other
evidence surfaced that contradicted the conclusion of mistake. Specif-
ically, the decedent did not, as one might have surmised from the Con-
necticut Junior case, sign the second codicil without reviewing its
contents. The second codicil was read aloud to him and he asked ques-
tions about it. Furthermore, decedent later told a long time friend
that he had "reverted or returned or gone back to his original list of
charities."' 3 0 These facts compelled the finding that the change in
charitable beneficiaries, though not initially requested by the dece-
dent, was ratified by him. Consequently, the disappointed charities
lost the malpractice case.i 3 i
The risk of interest-defeating reformation illustrated by this case
stems from the assumption that a drafter who confesses to error is an
authoritative source of the testator's true intent. The discrepancy be-
tween the drafter's view of the testator's intent as expressed in the
Connecticut Junior case and the evidence of testamentary intent the
drafter presented in the subsequent malpractice action raises the
question of the validity of that assumption. The assumption may be
invalid not only in the unusual case of drafting error ratification
presented by Connecticut Junior but in any case where the drafter
may have misunderstood the client's wishes or failed to recollect them
accurately at the time of the reformation application. In all such
cases, complete evidence of testamentary intent may fail to come
before the court hearing the reformation application if undue defer-
ence is accorded to the drafter.
5. Case 5: Uniquely Compelling Circumstantial Evidence'
32 -
The Impotence of a Broad Standard to Assure Relief
Testator and his fianc6 execute mutual (mirror image) wills. The wills pro-
vide that the estate of each will pass to the other, and that on the death of the
128. 448 A.2d at 199.
129. Conn. Junior Republic v. Doherty, 478 N.E.2d 735 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
130. Id. at 738.
131. Id. at 739
132. See Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998).
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survivor, the estate will be divided into two shares, one for the children of the
testator and one for the children of testator's fiance. The will fully and accu-
rately expresses the testator's desires. However, state law provides that a will
executed prior to marriage is deemed revoked unless the will expresses the
intent that it continue in force after marriage. 133 The will, as executed, does
not state expressly that the testator wishes it to remain valid after marriage.
Testator marries his fiancd two days after executing the will, and he dies
without revising the will.
Query: May the will be reformed to state expressly testator's intent
for the will to remain valid after the marriage?
Case 5 is hardly classic in the sense that it is unlikely to arise re-
peatedly, but it is an extreme example of a large class of cases involv-
ing apparently compelling circumstantial evidence.134 If this case is
susceptible to a singular analysis, then the safe harbor would be un-
necessary for at least some portion of the cases within the class it rep-
resents, and the Third Restatement approach would assure relief.
Conversely, if multiple interpretations of the evidence are possible on
these extreme facts, then the retention of the safe harbor is important
for the entire class of such cases, and the Third Restatement approach
will not necessarily effectuate intent.
In Case 5, the dispositive plan of the testator and his fiance, each
leaving his or her estate to the other and on the death of the survivor
to identical residuary beneficiaries, is a plan typical for married
couples. The execution of the will two days before the planned wed-
ding date strongly suggests that the testator intended the wil to re-
main in effect after the marriage. Difficulty arises notwithstanding
the will's absolute clarity regarding the testator's intent as a result of
a corrective statute revoking the will that is premised on a generaliza-
tion which, in all likelihood, does not apply to this testator.
133. Id. at 93. The statute involved in the Erickson case provided:
If, after the making of a will, the testator marries or is divorced or his
marriage is annulled or dissolved or a child is born to the testator or a
minor child is legally adopted by him, . . . and no provision has been
made in such will for such contingency, such marriage, divorce, annul-
ment, dissolution, birth or adoption of a minor child shall operate as a
revocation of such will, provided such divorce, annulment or dissolution
shall not operate as a revocation of such will if the spouse of the testator
was not a beneficiary under such will ....
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-257(A) (rev. to 1995). The statute was repealed in 1996,
the same year the testator in Erickson died, but the repeal was effective January
1, 1997. 1996 Conn. Acts 95, § 4 (Reg. Sess.).
134. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tuthill, 754 A.2d 272 (D.C. 2000) (involving omission of
spouse as beneficiary of family trust under instrument that established both the
family trust and a marital trust where the assets were insufficient to fund the
marital trust); Crisp Area Y.M.C.A. v. Nationsbank, N.A., 526 S.E.2d 63 (Ga.
2000) (involving designation of organization as beneficiary that ceased operations
six days prior to execution of the will); Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739
(Mass. 2000) (involving close relationship with claimants versus remote relation-
ship with individuals who would take in the absence of reformation).
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If characterized as an unambiguous mistake, no remedy would be
available under the historic approach, and the surviving spouse would
be relegated to a recovery in malpractice.' 3 5 There would, however,
be a tendency to characterize the will as ambiguous in order to justify
relief by construction based on the compelling circumstantial evi-
dence.136 In a system that offers relief for unambiguous mistakes as
well as ambiguities, however, defining ambiguity to exclude disposi-
tions like those in Case 5 that are clear but puzzling is justifiable be-
cause reformation provides a potential remedy. In Erickson v.
Erickson, on which Case 5 is based, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
adopted this approach, holding that the will was unambiguous but
that it could be reformed if there was clear and convincing evidence of
mistake.137
Interestingly, on remand the Superior Court held that the evidence
did not meet this standard.13s The court approached the issue by
looking for affirmative evidence that the testator desired the will to
remain operative beyond the two day window between the will execu-
tion ceremony and the marriage ceremony rather than focusing on the
senselessness of the plan as written (and re-written by applicable stat-
ute). The court found no such evidence existed because both the
drafter and the surviving spouse, who testified to this effect, were in-
credible.' 3 9 The drafter's testimony was discredited because it varied
slightly in the course of the proceedings; the surviving spouse's testi-
mony was discredited based on, among other things, evidence that she
had failed to check the box on the probate petition indicating that the
decedent had married after executing the proffered will.140 Other wit-
nesses testified on behalf of the surviving spouse as well, including a
neighbor, a brother and a son-in-law, but the testimony, colored by
135. As of 1999, only six states-Nebraska, New York, Texas, Virginia, Ohio and Ma-
ryland-retain a rule of absolute privity barring claims for estate planning mal-
practice by disappointed beneficiaries. Martin D. Begleiter, First Let's Sue all the
Lawyers-What Will We Get: Damages for Estate Planning Malpractice, 51 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 325 (2000). For a recent discussion of the policy considerations
prompting the expansion of malpractice liability, see Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452
(Haw. 2001). In some jurisdictions, standing is limited to beneficiaries who are
named in the will or another estate planning document. See, e.g., Espinosa v.
Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1993);
Beauchamp v. Kemmeter, 625 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
136. Erickson v. Erickson, No. CV 960387780S, 1997 WL 356047 (Conn. Super. Ct.
June 18, 1997), rev'd, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998). Alternatively, the statute might
be deemed inapplicable on the grounds that its application does not further its
purpose in this case, namely providing for a spouse excluded from an estate plan
prepared before marriage.
137. Id.






indirect interest, was insufficient to establish mistake with the requi-
site certainty. This counter-intuitive result is equally possible under
the Third Restatement approach which sanctions denial of relief when-
ever the finder of fact is unconvinced that the will, as written, incorpo-
rates a mistake.
One explanation for the odd outcome in Erickson is that the court
implicitly applied a family preference, requiring protection of the chil-
dren of the first marriage. The decedent's estate plan provided no
such protection because the provisions for them under the reciprocal
will executed by their step-mother could be revoked at will. Express
mention of this fact, the substantial inheritance received by the dece-
dent from his first wife, and the short duration of his marriage to the
surviving spouse at the time of the will execution, suggest that the
family preference played a pivotal role in the court's analysis.1 41
The family preference also, however, would have supported the op-
posite result because leaving the estate to the soon-to-be wife, is con-
sistent with general norms and sound estate planning.14 2
Consequently, if the family preference explicitly, as in the Fellows ap-
proach, or implicitly, as is possible in the Third Restatement approach,
determines the availability of reformation, the results will be highly
unpredictable, depending more on the fact finder's sense of equity
than the likelihood of the testator having erred. While Erickson itself
represents a risk of under-correction, the same issue could produce
cases of over-correction as well.
An alternative explanation for Erickson is that the court under-
stood the clear and convincing evidence standard to require direct evi-
dence in addition to the circumstantial evidence presented to the
Connecticut Supreme Court. This interpretation would preclude ref-
ormation where the only evidence of mistake was failure to dispose of
the estate in a manner consistent with the fact finder's expectations
for a similarly situated testator. The value of this protection, readily
apparent in most cases, is less apparent in the Erickson case but still
potentially important. If, for example, the testator's assets included
interests in employee benefit plans that provided for surviving
spouses but not fiances, testamentary provisions would be important
for the fianc6 prior to marriage while their continuation after mar-
riage could defeat intent if the testator desired to provide for his chil-
dren after assuring that his spouse received a certain amount. The
141. Id.
142. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOuND.
RES. J. 319, 367 (reporting empirical data establishing that 23 percent of dece-
dents would leave 100 percent of the estate to the surviving spouse if survived by
a minor child living with a former spouse, and a majority of decedents would give
the spouse more than half of the estate in this situation). Assets passing to the
surviving spouse qualify for the estate tax marital deduction. See I.R.C. § 2056.
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inclination to dismiss this possibility, in light of the likelihood that the
non-testamentary assets would be revealed in the reformation pro-
ceeding, assumes that the beneficiaries' lawyers will ascertain intent
more competently than the will will express it. Case 4 aptly demon-
strated the vulnerability of that assumption.' 43
6. Case 6: Undisposed of Property'4 4 -The Power of the Family
Preference to Preclude Apparently Justified Relief
(and the Inefficacy of the Safe Harbor to
Preclude It)
Testator's will devises $5 each to two children and the residuary estate to a
third child. The will specifically states: "I make no disposition of real estate as
that is devised by the will of my late husband." In fact the testator owned an
interest in real property as tenants in common with her husband which will
pass by intestacy to all three children in equal shares if it does not pass under
the residuary clause.
Query: May the will be reformed to provide that the real estate
passes to the residuary beneficiary?
Case 6, like Case 5, is one in which the will could be categorized as
ambiguous in order to create the possibility of relief in a system that
would deny relief for unambiguous mistakes. Yet the will is unambig-
uous in the sense that the testator clearly had no intention to dispose
of real property under her will. Where the error is evident from a pro-
vision of the will itself, adherence to the terms of the will Will not ad-
vance the testator's intent except by happenstance, and consideration
of extrinsic evidence may advance intent.' 4 5 Nevertheless, in In re
Estate of Dobrovolny, on which Case 6 is based, relief was denied.1 46
In the more typical case, where failure to dispose of a portion of the
estate is unexplained in the will, relief from strict application of the
historic approach is arguably unjustifiable because the Will itself is
effective, and the property not disposed of pursuant to express provi-
sions might have been intended to pass to intestate heirs. Accord-
ingly, courts typically, though not unfailingly, deny reformation in
such cases.14 7
143. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
144. This illustration is based on In re Estate of Dobrovolny, 318 P.2d 1053 (Kan.
1958).
145. But see Boone County Nat'l Bank v. Edson, 760 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1988) (holding
that court cannot correct mistake of drafter unless mistake as well as what the
testator would have done in the absence of mistake appears on the face of the
will); Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99 (1850) (stating that relief for mistake could be
available only if the instrument indicated the disposition the testator would have
made but for the mistake).
146. 318 P.2d at 1058.
147. See, e.g., Knupp v. D.C., 578 A.2d 702 (D.C. 1990) (holding that failure to desig-
nate residuary beneficiary not correctable resulting in escheat); In re Estate of
Smith, 599 N.E.2d 184 (IlM. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that omission of residuary
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Under the Third Restatement approach, an individualized analysis
would suggest that the real estate should pass to the residuary benefi-
ciary. As in Case 5, however, the flexibility of the approach would
accommodate the opposite result, which the finder of fact would be
inclined to reach if he was concerned about the testator's decision to
disinherit two of her three children. The family preference itself
would not constitute an overt part of the analysis, but it could, con-
sciously or unconsciously, color the interpretation of and weight ac-
corded to evidence of intent.
If relief is justified in Case 6 and other cases where the will fails to
dispose of a portion of the testator's property, it should extend to all
cases in which the testator fails to dispose of some portion of his prop-
erty under the will. This would alert drafters and testators to the
need to dispose of all property in the will even if the testator wishes
for some portion or items of property to pass to intestate heirs. Addi-
tionally, this would afford at least an opportunity to seek relief to
claimants, such as the child in Case 6, whose position may be at odds
with the fact finder's sense of the family preference.148
7. Case 7: Unanticipated Circumstances149-The Power of the
Family Preference to Create the Perception of Mistake
(and the Inefficacy of the Safe Harbor to
Preclude It)
Testator and his wife execute mutual (mirror image) wills providing that
the estate of each passes to the other, and upon death of the survivor, to the
children. If neither the spouse nor the children survive, the residue of the
estate is to be distributed in equal shares to the husband's mother, Rose, and
clause not correctable resulting in partial intestacy); Flannery v. McNamara, 738
N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 2000) (holding that failure to designate contingent beneficiary
not correctible resulting in intestacy); First Interstate Bank of Or., NA. v. Young,
853 P.2d 1324 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that failure to designate residuary
beneficiary in the event the decedent was not survived by her husband and to
designate a beneficiary of the portion of the residue not allocated to the martial
trust not correctable resulting in partial intestacy); Bob Jones Univ. v. Strandell,
543 S.E.2d 251 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that failure to dispose of residuary
estate not correctible resulting in partial intestacy); Kaufhold v. McIver, 682
S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that omission of residuary clause not
correctible resulting in partial intestacy). But see Greer v. Anderson, 259 S.W.2d
550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (holding that where will contained one dispositive pro-
vision and that provision failed to state the subject of the devise, will would be
construed to supply it).
148. If protection of the family, as determined in the eyes of the judge, is desirable,
then a family maintenance system similar to that in place in England and else-
where would be a more direct means of achieving this result. Under such a sys-
tem, the court has discretion to allocate a portion of the decedent's estate to his
survivors if the decedent has not made reasonable provisions for them. For a
brief overview of these statutes, see Brashier, supra note 35.
149. This illustration is based on Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892 (N.J. 1977).
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the wife's mother, Ida. Rose dies, and several years pass after which the
couple and their children die in a common disaster survived by Ida. By stat-
ute, when one residuary beneficiary predeceases the testator, the other resid-
uary beneficiaries share the estate pro rata.' 5 0
Query: May the will be reformed to provide that the portion of the
estate designated for Rose shall pass to Rose's children (testator's sib-
lings) on the theory that the couple intended to benefit the two fami-
lies equally?
In Case 7, the testator may not have contemplated seriously, or at
all, the possibility his wife, children and mother would predecease him
while his wife's mother survived. The probable failure to contemplate
the particular contingencies that in fact arose could justify either the
decision to disregard the will that does not address disposition in the
event of these contingencies or, alternatively, the refusal to attempt to
discern an intent that probably never was formulated. The historic
approach adopts the latter position.'51
Under New Jersey's construction doctrine of probable intent, which
allows the court to attempt to effectuate the testator's probable intent
in order "to accomplish what he would have done had 'he envisioned
[the actual circumstances that would exist at death],'" however, relief
may be available.15 2 In Engle v. Siegel,15 3 for example, upon which
Case 7 is based, the New Jersey Supreme Court disregarded the cor-
rective statute, effectively re-instating the common law result of par-
tial intestacy15 4 based on extrinsic evidence that "obviously"
150. Id. at 895. The statute involved in the Engle case provided as follows:
When a residuary devise or bequest shall be made to 2 or more persons
by the will of any testator... unless a contrary intention shall appear by
the will, the share of any such residuary devisees or legatees dying
before the testator and not saved from lapse [by anti-lapse statute which
provides that dispositions to certain relatives who predecease the testa-
tor pass to the issue of the predeceased relative], or not capable of taking
effect because of any other circumstance or cause, shall go to and be
vested in the remaining residuary devisee or legatee, if any there be, and
if more than 1, then to the remaining residuary devisees or legatees in
proportion to their respective shares in said residue.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-14, app. to vol. 3B (1983). The statue was repealed in
1977 and replaced with a substantially identical statute codified at 3B:3-37
(1983). 1977 N.J. Laws ch. 142, § 90.
151. See, e.g., In re Estate of Connolly, 222 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. 1974).
152. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 178 A.2d 185, 187 (N.J. 1962) (quoting Bank
of N.Y. v. Black, 139 A.2d 393, 398 (N.J. 1957)). For a general discussion of the
doctrine of probable intent, see Alfred C. Clapp, Justice Nathan L. Jacobs-The
Doctrine of Probable Intent, 28 RUTGERs L. Rav. 251 (1974). The probable intent
doctrine has been codified, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-33 (West 1999), yet courts ap-
plying the doctrine often omit reference to the statute. Cornelison, supra note 30,
at 844.
153. 377 A.2d 892.
154. Id. at 895-96. The will of the decedents wife presented the identical issue and
the result in the Engle case applied to her will as well. In the wife's case, the
entire estate would pass to the wife's mother in the absence of judicial interven-
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established an intent to divide the estate equally between the two
families if the couple was not survived by issue.15 5 Support for this
conclusion rested heavily on evidence supplied by the drafter of the
will. Testifying from notes written several years before the decedents'
deaths, the drafter stated that the couple had initially indicated that
they would like their property to be divided equally between their two
families in the event of a common disaster and that designation of the
mothers as beneficiaries resulted from the drafter's advice that desig-
nation of the "families" as beneficiaries was too imprecise.156 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the share of the estate designated for the
predeceased mother, Rose, would not pass to the surviving residuary
beneficiary, the mother-in-law, Ida, as the applicable statute would
require, and instead, the court determined Rose's share of the estate
should pass to Rose's issue.157
Under the Third Restatement approach, reformation should be un-
available in Case 7. If the (alleged) mistake is characterized as a fail-
ure to anticipate family members' order of death as opposed to a
failure to articulate accurately dispositive directives, it is outside the
scope of the reformation remedy altogether.15 s Even if the mistake is
characterized as one within the scope of reformation, the proof should
be insufficient to meet the Third Restatement standard. The testi-
mony of the drafter does not establish that the testators desired to
provide the share of a predeceased mother to the issue of that mother.
The testators and the drafter never discussed the possibility that the
testators would be survived by only one of the mothers, rendering his
view of the testators' actual dispositive wishes of little value. The
drafter testified only that the testators expressed the desire to divide
their estates between their families and that they identified their
mothers as the ultimate contingent beneficiaries only after the drafter
advised them that they needed to be more precise in their identifica-
tion of beneficiaries.
It is certainly possible that, as the court concluded, the testators
used "mothers" as a shorthand expression for "family."159 It is equally
possible, however, that the testators used "family" as an imprecise
description for their mothers, which they ultimately refined when the
tion under the applicable corrective statute. The same result would have oc-
curred under the "no residue of a residue rule" that the statute was designed to
reverse. The effect of the Engle decision in her case, passing half of the estate to
her husband's relatives, thus is contrary to either the common law or the statu-
tory approach. It also is inconsistent with a family preference that excludes in-
laws from the concept of family. Id.
155. Id. at 896.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 896-97.
158. THrRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 12.1 cmt. h, illus. 3.
159. Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892, 896 (N.J. 1977).
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drafter informed them that "family" was too imprecise a descriptor.
Apart from the drafter's testimony, nothing beyond general assump-
tions about providing for family over in-laws, or dividing estates
equally between relatives of spouses, would support the court's conclu-
sion. These general assumptions are improper sources of reliance in
the Third Restatement scheme and therefore would provide no support
for the grant of a remedy. Langbein and Waggoner, on whose work
the Third Restatement position heavily relies,i60 approve of the in-
quiry into intent in Engle v. Siegel but do not opine as to its outcome
under the standard they proposed.' 6 ' This leaves open the question
whether, as Fellows asserts, the family preference would seep unno-
ticed into the determination of actual intent.'
6 2
In this Case, as in Case 5, application of the family preference does
not provide a singular interpretation of intent.' 6 3 Fellows herself of-
fers two alternative explanations for the Engle decision. One is that
the court applied the family preference from the husband's perspec-
tive. 164 The will, as construed in light of the corrective statute, would
disinherit his family entirely for the benefit of his mother-in-law.
Under this view of the family preference, the mother-in-law is a non-
family member beneficiary who may share in the estate to the extent
the testator expressly manifested a desire to provide for her but may
not deprive his family of their rightful share in the absence of a clear
intent for this result. The alternative explanation is that the court
imputed intent for the couple together rather than for the testators
individually. As a unit, the couple intended "a fair distribution in
which their respective families would share equally."l65 Under this
view of the family preference, the mother-in-law is a family member
but her entitlement does not supersede that of collateral blood
relatives.
Yet another interpretation of the family preference would produce
a conclusion that relief was unjustified in the Engle case. Under this
view, family includes relatives by marriage and the family preference
embodies a preference for closer family members over more distant
relatives, and specifically, for parents over siblings just as intestacy
statutes do.166 A decision to provide for one's mother and mother-in-
160. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33.
161. Id.
162. Fellows, supra note 15.
163. Id. at 646.
164. Id. at 645.
165. Id. at 645-646.
166. Parents receive preferential treatment as compared to siblings in most intestacy
statutes, not only because they often qualify as heirs before and to the exclusion
of siblings and their issue but also because parents often will share with the sur-
viving spouse. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103, 8 U.L.A. 83 (1998) (provid-
ing that parents share with the surviving spouse if decedent is not survived by
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law to the exclusion of one's siblings is explicable either as a desire to
provide for the needs of aging family members167 or (or in conjunction
with) a desire to reciprocate for past support provided to one or one's
spouse.i 68 If the testators in Engel v. Siegel adopted this view of fam-
ily, then interpretation of the will adopted by the court would defeat
the testators' intent.
If relief is available in Case 7, there must be a basis upon which to
conclude that the otherwise applicable corrective statute (providing
for the estate to pass to the surviving residuary beneficiary) should be
disregarded. This basis must consist of more than the fact finder's
personal interpretation of the family preference because that, as
shown in the preceding discussion, is as likely to defeat intent as it is
to effectuate it.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The criteria to be used to evaluate alternative approaches to refor-
mation are not self-evident. The abstract attributes of rules or stan-
dards adjudication are insufficient because both approaches offer
important benefits while lacking critical protections. Standards pro-
vide flexibility, eliminating the possibility of results certain to defeat
intent that a rule might require as occurred in Case 5.169 Rules, in
contrast, provide certainty, assuring testators that they retain control
over their dispositive wishes, but fail to effectuate intent in cases of
clear error.
Empirical evidence would be an important source of guidance, but
such evidence is unavailable and much of it would be impossible to
obtain. Quantifying the percentage of cases in which particular types
of errors (or alleged errors) occur, for example, would indicate that
some of the illustrative cases would be more important than others in
designing a reformation approach. Sampling reformation cases de-
issue, and that if decedent is not survived by a spouse, parents take to the exclu-
sion of siblings and their issue). New Jersey follows the UPC approach. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 35.5-4 (West 1983). Other jurisdictions provide that siblings and
their descendants share with the surviving parents. See, e.g., TEx. PROB. CODE
§ 38 (West 1980) (providing that if one parent predeceases, siblings and their de-
scendants share with the surviving parent).
167. Fellows, supra note 142, at 341 (providing that if the decedent dies at an older
age, elderly ancestors may be economically dependent on the decedent).
168. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empri-
cal Study, 16 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 12 (1999) (citing 1 RIcHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND
CoNTRAcT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 431-43 (1914) for
the proposition that equity considerations of financial dependence is one objective
of intestacy statutes); Fellows et al., supra note 142 at 341 (arguing that if a
decedent dies young, unmarried and childless, fairness would seem to require
that the property be returned to the ancestor who provided it, or if the ancestor
predeceased, to his or her heirs).
169. See Sunstein, supra note 18.
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cided under a standard-oriented approach to ascertain how often court
decisions accorded with the true intent of the testator would identify
the degree of accuracy such a standard would provide. Most funda-
mentally, quantifying the percentage of unambiguous wills in which
errors actually existed would demonstrate the extent of the need for
liberalization of the strict approach to reformation of wills as well as
the extent of the risk imposed by a standard that would afford the
possibility of a remedy to unambiguous testamentary instruments.
Without that extrinsic evidence, evaluation of the relative merits of
each approach should be grounded the policy implications for testa-
tors, the estate planning profession, and the legal system generally.
The optimal reformation doctrine should provide an opportunity to
correct mistakes without permitting explicitly, as Fellows does, or im-
plicitly, as the Third Restatement does, discrimination based on the
family preference which may serve as an after the fact justification
rather than a pre-determination guide for reaching a particular con-
clusion. Additionally, the optimal reformation doctrine should coordi-
nate with malpractice liability and other aspects of professional
responsibility in a manner that maximizes the incentive to produce
error-free wills without imposing unnecessary cost. Finally, the opti-
mal reformation doctrine should limit the opportunity to reform wills
to preclude inquiries that are likely to be unproductive.
A. Impact on Testators
Cases 5170 and 7171 illustrate the risk of incorporating a family
preference into reformation doctrine for an individual who appears to
fit a typical profile: Case 5 involved a married man who provided for
his spouse and relied on her reciprocal will to provide for his children
from a prior marriage; Case 7 involved a married man who provided
for his spouse, or if she predeceased, for his children equally, or if they
predeceased, for his mother and mother-in-law. In each case, an inter-
pretation of the family preference that produces a result inconsistent
with the terms of the will, as written (and re-written by applicable
statute), will defeat intent if the testator meant what he said.
For atypical testators, the family preference creates a greater risk
because the bias against their wishes and values will be stronger. If
the class of atypical testators were limited to social outcasts, concern
for legal protection of their testamentary freedom would be minimal.
The increasing diversity in the composition of families,172 however,
170. See Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998).
171. See Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892 (N.J. 1977).
172. The 2000 Census reports that family households, defined as a household that
includes at least two members related by blood marriage or adoption, comprise
only 69 percent of all households, down from 81 percent in 1970. The most signif-
icant trend within this group is the decline in the proportion of married-couple
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suggests that an explicit or implicit "family preference" jeopardizes
the testamentary plans of a far larger group.
1. Discrimination-The Unmarried Couple
The illustrations discussed in Part I (all based on actual cases) may
be dismissed by skeptics as outside the mainstream or obviously
wrongly decided. If truth is stranger than fiction, a hypothetical may
illuminate more persuasively the threat that the family preference
poses. For this purpose, consider the hypothetical case of Ted, a suc-
cessful gay man who has accumulated an estate of $500,000. He con-
sults a lawyer for estate planning in order to provide for his partner,
Paul, with whom he has maintained a 20 year relationship. The law-
yer asks the usual questions, including whether Ted has living rela-
tives for whom he might wish to provide. Ted advises the lawyer that
he has a close relationship with his father but that his father is finan-
cially secure. The lawyer then drafts the will as requested which is
admitted to probate after Ted's death.
Ted's father brings a reformation proceeding based on the allega-
tion that the will was executed on the mistaken assumption that he
was financially secure when in fact he is not. He is about to enter a
nursing home, and Ted's $500,000 would allow him to enjoy better ac-
commodations than Medicaid otherwise would provide, at least for
some period of time. The lawyer testifies to his conversation with Ted.
Circumstantial evidence shows that Ted enjoyed a close relationship
with his father, that Paul is an independent professional who earns a
substantial salary, that friends considered Paul and Ted "a couple,"
and that Paul and Ted neither lived together nor combined their
finances.
Based on this evidence, it is certainly possible, and possibly likely,
that Ted's will will be reformed. Ted's father could put the money to
good use, Paul apparently does not need it, and the relationship of Ted
and Paul does not parallel a traditional spousal relationship that
would explain the bequest. Although Ted did not tell the lawyer that
he would have left his estate to his father if his father had a financial
need, the lawyer might have inferred this and testify accordingly in a
reformation proceeding. Even if the lawyer recounted his conversa-
tion with Ted verbatim, a court might itself infer that Ted would have
provided for his father if he had been aware of his father's need.
If Ted in fact erred, of course this effectuates his intent. But there
is a strong possibility he did not. The absence of traditional indicia of
households with their own children, from 40 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in
2000. The same census reports that more 3.7 percent of all households in the
United States, representing 3.8 million households, include unmarried partners.
Jason Fields, America's Families and Living Arrangements, CuRRNr PoPULA-
TION REPORTS P20-537 (June 2001).
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a spousal-type relationship says little about the feelings the couple
had for each other. The apparent discrepancy in need between father
and Paul may reflect a differential in willingness to disclose circum-
stances rather than the true state of affairs. Suppose, for example,
that Paul is infected with the AIDS virus and requires extremely ex-
pensive treatments that his insurance does not cover. If Paul is un-
willing to make his health situation a matter of public record, he
decreases the likelihood of defeating the reformation application.
Even if he does disclose, there is no guarantee that Ted's wishes will
prevail.
The serious jeopardy that Ted will face in realizing his testamen-
tary wishes is abundantly established by studies revealing the signifi-
cant role of the family preference in the analogous area of will
contests,' 7 3 and in particular, the impact this has on same sex
couples.17 4 Like questions of capacity and undue influence in will con-
tests, the issue of mistake in a reformation proceeding involves a
highly subjective evidentiary interpretation that is incapable of filter-
ing out insidious influences. Distressingly, reformation presents a
greater temptation to act on those insidious influences because it of-
fers the opportunity to re-write selective portions of the will as op-
posed to probate contests where the will generally is either admitted
or denied probate in total.' 7 5
173. See Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MN. L. REV. 571 (1997);
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 235
(1996); Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine:
What's Love Got to Do With It?, 57 Pir. L. REv. 841 (1996); Jeffrey Schoenblum,
Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 RRAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607 (1987);
Michael Falkner, Comment, A Case Against Admitting Into Evidence the Disposi-
tive Elements of a Will in a Contest Based on Testamentary Incapacity, 2 CONN. L.
REV. 616 (1970); Peter J. Van Every, Undue Influence--Judicial Implementation
of Social Policy, 1968 Wis. L. Rnv. 569; Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incom-
petency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944). Professor
Leslie argues that the undeniable bias in favor of family is not grounded in a
family preference per se but rather in a reciprocity norm pursuant to which
courts implicitly give effect to implied, unenforceable promises of testators to dis-
appointed devisees that created an expectation of testamentary beneficence ulti-
mately unfulfilled. Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance,
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REv. 551 (1999).
174. See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretricious Rela-
tionships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOT=E DAME L. REv. 200
(1989); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 225 (1981).
175. Partial probate, though infrequently used, is available where only a portion of a
will is infected by undue influence or other invalidity. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Webster, 110 P.2d 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941); In re Estate of Smelser, 818 P.2d 822
(Kan. Ct. App. 1991); In re Wharton, 453 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Surr. Ct. 1982) (and cases
cited therein); In re Estate of Herrly, 276 P.2d 247 (Okla. 1954).
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
In addition to the temptation to discriminate intentionally,176 the
possibility of unintentional bias also must be considered. A conscien-
tious judge, respectful of the relationship of Ted and Paul, may be in-
clined to analogize their relationship to that of a married couple.
Even if the family preference would produce predictable results for the
married couple, its extension to Ted and Paul would be imperfect be-
cause underlying legal protections,' 7 7 societal expectations and other
factors differentiate the married from the unmarried couple. This ob-
servation is buttressed by an empirical study conducted by Fellows
and colleagues designed to assess public attitudes about the inclusion
of surviving committed partners as intestate heirs.' 7 8 The study,
which asked respondents to divide the property of an intestate dece-
dent involved in a non-marital committed relationship that termi-
nated as a result of death among the decedent's survivors in eight
different scenarios, revealed that respondents with same sex partners
were consistently more generous to surviving partners, whether same
sex or opposite sex, than were the respondents from the general pub-
176. The probability of discrimination probably would be lower in reformation cases
where facts are determined by the court than in will contests where facts often
are decided by juries. Schoenblum, supra note 173; Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6
STuN. L. REv. 91 (1953). To the extent courts recognize a same sex partner as a
natural object of the testator's bounty, as the Third Restatement suggests, inten-
tional discrimination would be absent. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. c, § 18.3 cmt. f(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). For debate on
the question whether juries' tendency to overturn wills satisfying the legal re-
quirements for validity is appropriate, compare Ronald Chester, Less Law, but
More Justice?: Jury Trials and Mediation as Means of Resolving Will Contests, 37
DuQ. L. REV. 173 (1999) (arguing that, despite the common law focus on the mind
of the testator, the proper inquiry in will contests should address the fairness of
the resulting distribution), with Josef Athanas, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials
in Will Contests, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529 (1990) (arguing that the "equitable
fairness" juries may provide in resolution of wills disputes should be supplied by
legislative changes to laws that are "equitably unfair").
177. Unmarried partners generally qualify neither as intestate heirs nor as surviving
spouses entitled to a minimum share of the estate notwithstanding decedent's
will. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that un-
married partner does not qualify as surviving spouse for purposes of the elective
share); Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1989) (finding no intes-
tacy right for unmarried partner in decedent's partner's estate and therefore no
social security benefits either). See also Raum v. Rest. Assoc., Inc. 675 N.Y.S.2d
343 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that same sex partner is not entitled to assert a
wrongful death claim in connection with deceased partner's death). But see
Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (declining to adopt a bright line test
precluding wrongful death claim of decedent's fianc6). There are, however, a few
exceptions to this generalization. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:2-202 (1998) (per-
mitting unmarried partners, like any other individuals, to designate each other
as reciprocal beneficiaries); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1202, 1204 (1999) (recogniz-
ing civil unions between same sex couples and granting them "all the same bene-
fits, protections and responsibilities under law.., as are granted to spouses in a
marriage").
178. Fellows, supra note 168.
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lic. 1 7 9 While the different preferences of same sex versus opposite sex
partners would not necessarily carry over into individual testamen-
tary plans,SO they might. An empirical study of testamentary prefer-
ences of same sex partners would provide generic information that is
currently unavailable, but it would be of marginal value in facilitating
their exercise of testamentary freedom. Any family preference, how-
ever refined, mutes the individuality that our recognition of testamen-
tary freedom is designed to allow individuals to express.
2. Should the Atypical Bear the Risk of Intent-Defeating
Reformation for the Benefit of Those Who Err?
The most important policy question involved in will reformation
doctrine is whether the occasional incorrect results produced by the
implicit application of the family preference is a tolerable price to pay
for the promise of liberal availability of relief a standard like the
Third Restatement approach would afford. In the absence of extrinsic
evidence quantifying the frequency of incorrect results and the scope
of the risk imposed by implicit application of the family preference,
assumptions about these factors must suffice. Granting the benefit of
the doubt to the drafters of the Third Restatement, it shall be assumed
that intent-effectuating reformation would occur more frequently than
would intent-defeating reformation, and that the malleability of the
family preference will not impose significant risk to testators whose
estate plans, as written, reflect traditional values. Under these as-
sumptions, the brunt of the family preference, and the risk of intent-
defeating reformation generally, would fall most heavily on "abhor-
rent testators"1 81 whose estate plans deviate from traditional norms
and who suffer disproportionate risk of intent-defeating resulting in
other types of wills disputes.' 8 2 The abhorrent testators, by defini-
tion, constitute a minority, and the Third Restatement therefore could
be regarded as inuring to the benefit of the majority and thus enhanc-
ing the realization of testamentary wishes for testators in the
aggregate.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 167 and 168 (noting that considerations involved in intestacy
statutes are not limited to what decedent would do if he executed a will).
181. The term "abhorrent testator" was coined by Professor Spitko to describe the tes-
tator who disinherits a legal spouse or close blood relations in favor of a non-
mainstream religion, a radical political organization, a same sex romantic part-
ner or other beneficiary that represents a choice outside the mainstream. E.
Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 275 (1999) (proposing a system of testator-compelled arbitration to
insulate against the bias in favor of family).
182. See supra notes 173 and 174.
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There is an immediately apparent irony about evaluating an exer-
cise of freedom by reference to majoritarian norms. On the other
hand, sacrificing the interests of the majority for the benefit of a mi-
nority group defined by its desire to dispose of property unusually is
not an intuitively compelled result.
An appropriate basis for determining the relative weight of the
competing claims of minority testators who accurately express their
testamentary wishes and majoritarian testators who would benefit
from a liberal reformation doctrine is the underlying rationale for rec-
ognizing testamentary freedom which may suggest a reason to prefer
the majority, a reason to protect the minority, or a reason to protect
those who express themselves accurately, regardless of whether their
wishes conform to majoritarian norms or not.
The most prevalent' 8 3 justification for testamentary freedom is the
utilitarian view which posits that testamentary freedom is not a right
but rather a privilege offered for the purpose of motivating socially
desirable behavior.14 Adopting this view of testamentary freedom,
183. There are, of course, other justifications for testamentary freedom. Professor Ep-
stein, for example, states:
[Tihere is no principled distinction between the right of property and the
right of succession. The conception of property includes the exclusive
rights of possession, use and disposition. The right of disposition in-
cludes dispositions during life, by gift or by sale, and it includes disposi-
tions at death, which are limited only by the status claims of family
members protected, for example, by rules relating to dower and forced
shares.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 304 (1985).
184. Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Rev-
olutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1, 8 (1977-1978) ("American state and federal
courts since the foundation of the new nation have been equally committed to the
positivist argument."); see also Ronald Chester, Essay: Is the Right to Devise
Property Constitutionally Protected?-The Strange Case ofHodel v. Irving, 24 Sw.
U. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1995); Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 636-637 (1989); Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance: A Con-
stitutional Right?, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 751 (1984); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Pos-
thumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on
Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1285 (1999). Apart
from the utilitarian justification, there are other positivist theories of testamen-
tary freedom as well. See PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 29, § 1.7 (citing Eric H.
Kaden, The Peasant Inheritance Law in Germany, 20 IoWA L. REv. 350 (1935));
Charmont, Changes in Family Law in Progress of Continental Law in the 19th
Century, in 11 CONrINENTrAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES 147, 160 (1918) (arguing that
a scheme of forced distribution based on equality of children or other close rela-
tives within the same degree of consanguinity would cause the breaking up of
tracts of land into small portions so that eventually they would become so small
as to be uneconomical). Of course, any positivist approach to testamentary free-
dom leaves open the possibility that testamentary freedom should be severely
curtailed or eliminated altogether. For contemporary competing views on the
value of testamentary freedom, compare Barbara R. Hauser, Death Duties and
Immortality: Why Civilization Needs Inheritances, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
363 (1999) (arguing that the right to bequeath is fundamental to the existence of
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the Supreme Court, in 1942, declared: "Rights of succession to the
property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statu-
tory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by suffer-
ance."l 8 5 Under this view, expressed by Blackstone among others, the
right to transmit property at death is merely a privilege conferred by
the state for its own purposes and not an inherent element of property
ownership:
[Niaturally speaking, the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any
dominion: else if he had a right to dispose of his acquisitions one moment
beyond his life, he would also have a right to direct their disposal for a million
of ages after him; which would be highly absurd and inconvenient.
1 8 6
The initial reason for conferring a right to dispose of property after
death was, in Blackstone's view, a fortuity driven by practicality. He
believed that inheritance rights originally developed because:
A man's children or nearest relations are usually about him on his death-bed,
and are the earliest witnesses of his decease. They became therefore gener-
ally the next immediate occupants, till at length in process of time this fre-
quent usage ripened into general law. And therefore also in the earliest ages,
on failure of children, a man's servants born under his roof were allowed to be
his heirs; being immediately on the spot when he died. For we find the old
patriarch Abraham expressly declaring, that "since God had given him no
seed, his steward Eliezer, one born in his house, was his heir."
1 8 7
a thriving market economy, and thus to civilization, and that the right to devise
supports a "deep human need" to live on and provide for future generations), with
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MicH. L. Rxv. 69 (1990) (propos-
ing severe restrictions on testamentary freedom in order to increase equality of
opportunity and raise revenue).
185. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). Subsequently, the U.S. Su-
preme Court declared that the right to transfer property at death, a part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times, is a Constitutionally protected
property right in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). Irving held that the
Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, which directed that interests in land fall-
ing below specified size and dollar thresholds would escheat at the death of the
owner to the tribe to which the land initially was allotted by prior Act of Congress
without any provision for compensation to the owner, violated the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Read broadly, Irving would reverse the his-
toric understanding of the source of testamentary freedom. Read more restric-
tively, Irving does not guarantee the opportunity to transmit property at death in
all cases but rather only in those situations where there is no viable opportunity
to transfer property by other means (i.e., by will substitute). Chester, supra note
184. The view expressed in Irving was re-iterated in Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S.
234 (1997), but the scope of the holding was not clarified.
186. 2 SIR WILLIA BLAcKsTONE, ESQ., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 10
(Oxford 1766). Thomas Jefferson, the American with whom the positivist view is
most prominently associated, stated: "[Elarth belongs in usufruct to the living,
that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.... [Tihe portion occupied
by an individual ceases [to be] and reverts to the society." RONALD CHESTER, IN-
HERrTANCE, WEALTH, AND SocIEry 35 (1982) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 116
(P. L. Ford ed., 1895)).
187. Blackstone, supra note 186, at 13.
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At the same time, he recognized the motivational impact inheri-
tance would have on individuals.1 8 8 The ability to control devolution
of property after death encourages individuals to accumulate wealth,
engaging in economically productive activity and saving rather than
consuming.18 9 Without the ability to control disposition of property at
death, individuals would have less incentive to continue economically
productive activity and more incentive to consume because there
would be no means of enjoying their property after death. Testamen-
tary freedom is thought to encourage socially desirable behavior on
the part of hopeful beneficiaries as well, promoting loyalty and respon-
siveness to family members and others who may be expected to re-
ward this behavior with tokens of appreciation at death.190
This explanation for testamentary freedom suggests that the para-
mount consideration in the development of a will reformation doctrine
is not effectuation of actual dispositive wishes after death because no
societal benefit is derived from effectuating actual wishes that were
unexpressed.1 9 Neither does it support, however, the argument that
actual intent is irrelevant because a reformation rule that creates sig-
nificant obstacles to realization of testamentary wishes will blunt the
motivational impact of testamentary freedom. Instead, the utilitarian
view supports the argument that reformation doctrine ought to be
structured in the manner that will provide the fairest possible oppor-
tunity to realize testamentary freedom for those who seek to exercise
it.
Fairness arguments may be asserted by both advocates of the
traditional rule-oriented approach as well as advocates of the Third
188. Id. ("It is true, that the transmission of one's possessions to posterity has an
evident tendency to make a man a good citizen and a useful member of society: it
sets the passions on the side of duty, and prompts a man to deserve well of the
public, when he is sure that the reward of his services will not die with himself,
but be transmitted to those with whom he is connected by the dearest and most
tender affections.")
189. JEREMY BENrHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CML CODE, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 308, 337 (John Bowring ed., 1962); BLACKSTONE, supra note 186, at 11;
Edmond N. Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 145 (1936);
Joseph Gold, Freedom of Testation, 1 MOD. L. REv. 296, 296-297 (1938); Gordon
Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465 (1971). The incentive effects
of testamentary freedom are an important justification for the libertarian opposi-
tion to inheritance reform, see Chester, supra note 186, at 81-88 (discussing views
of Friedman, Hayek, and Nozick), but as critics note, there is no empirical evi-
dence to support the supposition that testamentary freedom inspires accumula-
tion of wealth. Id. at 86-87 (noting the absence of such evidence).
190. BENTHAM, supra note 189, at 338; BLACKSTONE, supra note 186, at 11; Gabrielle
A. Brenner, Why Did Inheritance Laws Change?, 5 INT. REV. L. & ECON. 91
(1985); Max Nathan, Jr., An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced Heir-
ship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1977); Carole Shammas, English Inheritance Law
and Its Transfer to the Colonies, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 145, 149-150 (1987).
191. Hirsch, supra note 184, at 636-637.
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Restatement liberalization. 192 The traditionalist argument, as articu-
lated by Professor Alexander asserts:
Certainty of result is a significant, if not the primary feature of the law of
inheritance.... Although insistence on correct form appears at first to thwart
the accomplishment of a property owner's wishes, the purpose of that insis-
tence may actually be the opposite. By providing for a certain result, such
rules enable those willing to take the trouble to adopt the proper form to be
certain about the outcome of their actions. The formality prevents competing
claims of unfairness from becoming issues. If form were not so important,
courts would continuously be confronted with the invitation to balance
counterveiling interests against the precision of the property owner's state-
ment of intent. But instead a court can reject a document when improperly
expressed-however "unfair" that rejection may be-and accept a property
owner's statement made in proper the form-however "unfair" its disposition
of property may be. In that light, one can understand [decisions apparently
thwarting intent] even if the "unfairness" in [the particular case] is
extreme.
19 3
This philosophical analysis of fairness is inseparable from value
judgements about the relative merits of rules versus standards. Advo-
cates of standards-oriented approaches can rebut this analysis, as
Langbein and Waggoner have done, by asserting that the strictures of
a rule are unnecessary to effectuate intent in many, albeit not all,
cases.194 Framed in this way, the argument fails to address the ques-
tion: should the testators who express themselves accurately receive
protection at the expense of those whose actual wishes, inaccurately
stated, could be effectuated with a liberal reformation doctrine?
If, however, fairness is analyzed based on practical consequences
rather than philosophical outcomes, evaluation of the alternative ap-
proaches to reformation may be segregated, at least in part, from gen-
eral views about the relative merits of rules and standards. The
practical consequences to be considered include the extent to which
the reformation approach comports with testators' expectations, the
burden that the reformation approach imposes on the planning pro-
cess, and the burden that the reformation approach imposes after
death.
Empirical evidence is unavailable, but it seems appropriate to as-
sume that testators expect their wishes to be respected as written.
Whether the will is formal or holographic, the testator understands
that he executes the document for the purpose of expressing his
wishes. There is no reason he would expect an inquiry to occur after
death that could change the dispositive scheme he adopted. In the
Ted and Paul hypothetical, for example, Ted has no reason to believe
that his will, which clearly provides for Paul, may be re-written to
192. See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 995.
193. George J. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardian-
ship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REy. 1003, 1018-1019 (1979).
194. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, at 566-571.
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substitute his father. Nor does he have any reason to know that de-
tailed explanation of his reasons for dispositive choices, either set
forth in the will or provided orally to the lawyer or others, may be
required in order for his plan to be respected. Similarly, in Case 4,195
which involved a typical estate plan, the testator has no inkling that
the change in the charitable beneficiaries may be disregarded because
he did not orally confirm to the lawyer wishes that were unambigu-
ously set forth in that document. A liberalized approach to reforma-
tion, such as the Third Restatement's, imposes these obligations
without any provision for notifying the testator of them, which un-
fairly creates the possibility of defeating intent.
Advocates of liberal relief could counter that testators would expect
clear errors in wills to be corrected. The validity of the argument,
however, depends entirely on the definition of "clear error." Testators
who agree with this proposition would include, within the definition of
clear error, unequivocal mistakes such as those involved in Cases 1196
and 2.197 Many might conceive of clear error more expansively, but
their conception would not parallel the highly complex definition of
the Third Restatement complete with exclusions98 and evidentiary
restrictions.1 99 Instead, their conception of clear error would embrace
situations in which error, in fact, occurred. Put differently, testators
who expect errors other than unequivocal errors to be corrected also
expect accurate wills to be respected. From each individual testator's
perspective, the Third Restatement fulfills this dual expectation no
better than the historic approach because an attempt to correct an er-
ror that is less than unequivocal risks violating accurately expressed
intent just as the historic approach's refusal to correct errors presents
the opposite risk. From the perspective of testators in the aggregate,
neither approach can be proven superior to the other because that
would require empirical evidence about which better effectuates ac-
tual intent, a difficult to impossible undertaking not attempted to
date.200 Consequently, this counter-argument does little to under-
mine the proposition that testators expect their wishes to be followed
as written.
A second criterion by which to judge the fairness of the reformation
doctrine is comparison of the burdens imposed by the reformation al-
ternatives at the planning stage: the obligation to avoid unambiguous
error imposed by a strict approach to reformation versus the obliga-
tion to assure, during life, that a challenge to an accurate will after
195. See supra note 124.
196. See supra note 90.
197. See supra note 99.
198. See supra notes 70, 71.
199. See supra notes 72-78.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
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death will be unsuccessful. If the burden to avoid unambiguous error
is heavier than the burden of precluding an unmeritorious challenge,
then the liberalizations incorporated into the Third Restatement are
appropriate. Conversely, if the burden to avoid unambiguous error is
less demanding than the alternative, then the safe harbor protection
of the historic approach is justified. Consideration of the relative bur-
dens compel the conclusion that safe harbor protection is critical.
The burden of assuring that a challenge to an accurate will is un-
successful requires the testator to control any and all extrinsic evi-
dence of intent that may come before the court after his death. To
attempt to satisfy this burden, the testator who is concerned about an
intent-defeating reformation might feel compelled to explain his rea-
sons for dispositive choices that he would prefer to keep private; to
limit conversations with family and friends about estate planning in
order to limit the possibility of misunderstandings that could create a
belief reformation was appropriate; and to generate additional sup-
porting documentation reinforcing his clearly stated wishes. These
steps are not only undesirable but also insufficient to achieve the pur-
pose of insulating a will from an intent-defeating reformation. The
testator can control neither the evidence litigants choose to place
before the court after his death nor the manner in which the court
perceives it, and therefore he cedes some of his authority to express
testamentary wishes to those who are interested in disposition of his
estate.
In comparison to the burden of controlling extrinsic evidence that
will be presented to a court after death, the burden of avoiding unam-
biguous error in the will is markedly lighter. With respect to potential
errors that originate with the testator, the testator has almost full
control, and therefore, the burden to avoid these mistakes is quite
manageable. In these cases, the testator has access to the true facts
but fails either to uncover them (so that he conveys to the drafter
wishes that would be different if he had understood the factual situa-
tion) or to convey them (so that he incorrectly describes relevant infor-
mation to the drafter resulting in an error in the will). The only
situation in which the testator does not have access to the true facts,
which are later available to a court considering a reformation applica-
tion, is the rare case in which there is a change in the availability of
information after the death of the testator, allowing disappointed ben-
eficiaries to uncover information the testator could not have uncov-
ered. Even in these cases, a remedy should rarely be granted under
the Third Restatement approach because the testator, in all likelihood,
would not formulate a dispositive plan for a situation of which he was
unaware.
In cases of errors that originate with the drafter, the burden of
avoidance is more significant, particularly in cases of tax and other
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substantive (as opposed to ministerial) mistakes that a testator has no
reasonable opportunity to discover. As Langbein and Waggoner put it:
To frustrate the wishes of a testator who had the prudence to follow counsel's
direction seems especially offensive if it is avoidable. Since testators cannot
be expected to discover their lawyers' mistakes, the question is whether to
charge them with such mistakes when the evidence clearly establishes what
was really wanted. We think it palpable that in these circumstances the tes-
tator's intent should be implemented if it can be proved with appropriate
certainty.
2 0 1
Even in these cases, however, the existence of liberal reformation
relief is not indispensable to the provision of a fair opportunity to exer-
cise testamentary freedom. By exercising responsibility in the selec-
tion of a careful and competent drafter, the testator reduces the risk of
legal or scrivener's error. Moreover, in the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions, the testator's wishes could be effectuated through a malpractice
action.202 Consequently, reformation would be unnecessary in most
cases to effectuate the wishes of testators who erred; it would serve
only to insulate erring lawyers from loss.
Finally, a fairness analysis requires comparison of the burdens im-
posed after death of a strict versus a liberal approach to reformation.
Under a strict approach, the burden imposed by reformation falls on
the erring testator himself in that his actual wishes will not be carried
out. Under a liberal approach, the burden of reformation falls on all to
the extent that every estate is subject to the possibility of nuisance
litigation. Imposition of this burden transfers wealth from named
beneficiaries to lawyers and others involved in litigation for the sake
of a group (indeterminate in size) that errs under circumstances which
will allow a court to discern intent accurately. This burden is argua-
bly unfair and definitely inconsistent with maximizing productivity of
societal resources.
All of this suggests that an approach to reformation requiring tes-
tators to avoid unambiguous mistake would facilitate fair opportunity
to realize testamentary wishes more effectively than would a reforma-
tion doctrine that ascertained intent based on evidence outside testa-
tors' control. Judged by this criterion, preservation of a safe harbor is
essential to a will reformation doctrine, but correction of true errors is
undeniably important.
201. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, at 571.
202. As Langbein and Waggoner note, malpractice liability does not redress mistakes
in every situation. Where fault for the mistake lies with the testator, the lawyer's
error falls below the threshold of liability, the lawyer is judgment proof, the juris-
diction does not recognize malpractice liability, or the property at issue has a
sentimental value that cannot be captured by a damages remedy, malpractice
relief will be incomplete. Id. at 589.
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B. Impact on the Estate Planning Profession
The impact of will reformation doctrine on the estate planning pro-
fession is an important policy consideration because consequences for
the profession have consequences for clients which stem from the di-
rect relationship between reformation and malpractice liability. If ref-
ormation is available to rectify mistakes for which a negligent lawyer
otherwise would be responsible, the risk of loss shifts from the lawyer
to the competing beneficiaries. If reformation in fact reflects the tes-
tator's intent, the beneficiary's "loss" is merely elimination of an un-
warranted windfall. If, on the other hand, an intent-effectuating
reformation required to rectify a lawyer's error is denied, the negli-
gent lawyer escapes liability at the expense of the intended
beneficiary.
In addition to this basic shift of risk, there are indirect conse-
quences of supplanting malpractice liability with a reformation rem-
edy, including: (1) a reduction in the accuracy of planning, (2) a
change in the nature of the financial stakes involved in the litigation
over intent that in some cases may reduce the quality of proof
presented, and (3) a potential implicit or explicit change in the stan-
dard of proof for malpractice or reformation claims in a regime where
the standard of proof ostensibly differs in malpractice and reformation
cases. In such a regime, the potential change occurs by either limiting
the ability of disappointed beneficiaries to recover (if the standard of
proof for malpractice is increased) or by increasing the risk that accu-
rately expressed wishes will be defeated (if the standard of proof for
reformation is decreased).
1. Accuracy in Planning
The premium that a strict approach to reformation places on accu-
racy should tend to motivate care on the part of the lawyer and the
client in the planning process and thus reduce the likelihood that er-
ror will occur. To the extent a liberalized approach reduces that care,
it will tend to increase the incidence of mistake and thus exacerbate
the problem it seeks to alleviate.
Anticipating this argument, Langbein and Waggoner have as-
serted that, because reformation is a rule of litigation, no drafter
would plan to rely on it when proper drafting can spare the expense
and hazard of litigation.203 While it is illogical to assume that one
would knowingly draft a problematic instrument in reliance on the
availability of an opportunity to correct it later, that is quite different
from believing that the level of care exercised by lawyers will be unaf-
fected by the possibility of malpractice liability. Clearly, potential
203. Id. at 587.
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malpractice liability does affect the overall quality of service. 20 4 With-
out it, the deterrent of malpractice liability is eliminated from the
cost-benefit analysis used to compute the minimum necessary work
and replaced with the weaker deterrent of subsequent reformation lit-
igation in which the lawyer has no direct self interest.20 5
To the extent this temptation attracts lawyers to the field of estate
planning who otherwise would consider the field outside their exper-
tise, it exacerbates the economic pressure faced by the experienced es-
tate planning lawyers. Compelled to compete with less experienced
lawyers that clients perceive as providing the same service at lower
cost, the responsible professional will have an incentive greater than
ever to reduce the time devoted to matters below that which he other-
wise would feel was appropriate. Thus, the law's support for the inex-
perienced and incompetent increases the likelihood that a client will
find his planning in the hands of one ill-equipped to handle it.
2. Lawyer's Testimony in Reformation Proceedings
The best witness in a reformation proceeding would seem to be the
lawyer. He hears the testator's own articulation of testamentary
wishes under circumstances in which the testator has every motiva-
tion to express them forthrightly; this occurs in near proximity to the
time of will execution; and the lawyer will have no interest in the dis-
204. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.1 (3d ed.
1989); Martin D. Begleiter, You've Got to Know When to Hold Up, Know When to
Fold Up, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 193, 275 (1990) (citing Auric v. Contl Cas. Co., 331
N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983)); Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate
Planning and General Practice, 17 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 521 (1987); see also
Jessie Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables of Property: A River Found at Last, 65
IOWA L. REv. 151 (1979) (arguing that malpractice liability may provide an eco-
nomic incentive to rationalize outmoded rules of law). Cf. Jacob L. Todres, Mal-
practice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of Areas in Which Malpractice
Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547 (1999) (observing that many errors in the tax context
are not due to complexity but to failure to comply with a "simple, clearly man-
dated requirement").
205. Johnston, supra note 204, at 528, 530 ("[Tjhe "loss leader" approach to will prepa-
ration, even in conjunction with the long run potential for lucrative probate fees,
does not provide sufficient incentive for most practitioners to take the time and
effort necessary to do a thorough, competent job of estate planning. Corners are
often cut for cost savings, and the malpractice risk is increased significantly....
[However,] [o]nce malpractice exposure is appreciated, most practitioners are
willing to do a competent job in order to minimize the risk of liability, even if the
estate planning work itself is not fully compensatory."); Gerald P. Johnston, Le-
gal Malpractice in Estate Planning-Perilous Times Ahead for the Practitioner,
67 IoWA L. REv. 629, 710 (1982) ("While [legal] malpractice may not be greeted
with a great deal of enthusiasm by the practicing bar, the potential of such liabil-
ity serves as incentive for the improvement of attorneys' practices, and thus bet-
ter service is provided to the community. Such a salutory effect can only prove
beneficial in the area of estate planning, where minimal effort and modest
charges have too long prevailed.").
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position estate.2 06 Malpractice or reputational concerns create a self-
interest that could tend to color the testimony in favor of the will as
written, reducing the value of testimony to establish the will was accu-
rate,207 but the same self-interest would seem to lend special credibil-
ity to the testimony of a lawyer who confesses to error.
208
To the extent reformation reduces or supplants malpractice liabil-
ity, only reputational concerns engender this special credibility. In
light of the importance of professional reputation, reliance on it to as-
sure credibility appears viable. However, a review of recent decisions
in New York, one of the few jurisdictions in which the absence of priv-
ity bars malpractice recovery by disappointed beneficiaries, reveals an
extraordinary willingness to confess to error.20 9 Simple honesty is one
206. There is an ethical prohibition against drafting a will that includes provisions for
the attorney-drafter or close relatives. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R.
1.8(c) (1983).
207. For example, in Estate of Utterback, 521 A.2d 1184 (Me. 1987), the court, in ad-
hering to the traditional rule excluding statements of intent made by the testator,
stated:
Testimony concerning statements of intent made by a testator at or near
the time he made his will is almost always self-serving and rarely objec-
tive. The residuary beneficiaries note that several states have relaxed
the rule excluding oral statements of the testator's intent, particularly
when the statements are made to the scrivener. The testimony of scriv-
eners, however, concerning the oral declarations of the testator may be
just as questionable as the testimony of non-attorneys .... [A]dmission
of testimony concerning the oral declarations of the testator's intent
would subvert the very purpose of the Statute of Wills: to provide a relia-
ble source of the testator's intent expressed under circumstances where
the testator fully understands the significance and permanence of the
statements he has reduced to written form.
Id. at 1188 (citation omitted). See also In re Estate of Campbell, 655 N.Y.S.2d
913, 920 (Surr. Ct. 1997) (and cases cited therein) (expressing skepticism about
the value of testimony of an otherwise honest practitioner who may be called
upon to testify decades after the estate planning transaction, or who may fear
damage to his reputation, loss of business or legal action because of a perceived
error in the expression of the client's desires). Cf. In re Estate of Pozarny, 677
N.Y.S.2d 714 (Surr. Ct. 1998) (declining to consider testimony of drafter of poorly
drafted instrument), superseded by statute on other grounds, In re Estate of Wick-
wire, 705 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div. 2000). Where the will is ambiguous these con-
cerns are less pressing than in the case of an alleged mistake in an unambiguous
will. See In Re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
208. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, at 588. For a fully developed argument in
favor of such an approach, see deFuria, supra note 14.
209. See In re Merns, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 2001, at 18, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.); In re Florio,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 1999, at 27, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.) (involving drafter who testified
that he failed to edit model will provisions to conform to testator's instructions);
In re Hall, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1999, at 34, col. I (Surr. Ct.) (involving drafter who
admitted that percentage shares of residuary estate totaling 110 percent resulted
from scrivener's error); In re Chiarenza, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1998, at 25, col. 5 (Surr.
Ct.) (involving drafter who submitted affidavit stating that reference in will to
"wife" rather than "husband" and "dependents" rather than "descendants" was
the result of drafting error); In re Silkworth, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1997, at 36, col. 5
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explanation, but the discrepancy between testimony in reformation
proceedings and malpractice proceedings in the few reported cases in
which both reformation and malpractice suits were litigated suggests
this explanation may be incomplete.2 10
An important factor that may contribute to a difference in the law-
yer's testimony in malpractice proceedings as opposed to reformation
proceedings is the difference between the financial stakes in the two
types of suits. In the malpractice case, the lawyer stands to lose as-
sets already acquired. In the reformation case, in contrast, he will, at
worst, suffer a reduction in future earnings. Moreover, if family mem-
bers of the testator or others close to him who are interested in the
reformation proceeding are, or may become, future clients, the lawyer
may have a financial incentive to support reformation of the testator's
will.
The interest of the named beneficiaries in defending an unwar-
ranted reformation suit will not offset this problem because they, like
the lawyer, may have disincentives to unearth proof. Their long run
financial interest, like the lawyer's, may be better served by acquiesc-
ing in the reformation if, for example, they are natural objects of the
bounty of those benefitted by the reformation. Additionally, their di-
rect potential for loss, like the lawyer's, is, at worst, loss of an expec-
tancy. This may be insufficient to merit expenditure of current assets
(Surr. Ct.) (involving drafter who affirmed that the failure to dispense with bond
for testamentary trustee was the result of typographical error); In re Wadler,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1997, at 30, col. 1 (Surr. Ct.) (involving drafter who stated that
he had "lifted" language from a previous will and incorrectly inserted it in testa-
tor's will); In re Ervolina, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1997, at 36, col. 2 (Surr. Ct.) (involving
drafter who stated that disposition to "my children ... and their issue per stirpes"
reflected drafting error in that it failed to provide that grandchildren were to take
only if decedent's children predeceased him); In re Gottfried, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 11,
1997, at 25, col. 2 (Surr. Ct.) (involving drafter of inter vivos trust who acknowl-
edged drafting error in omitting to limit scope of power of appointment over prin-
cipal); In re Sweeney, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1996, at 30, col. 5 (Surr. Ct.) (involving
drafter who stated that the failure to limit the provision disposing of residue to
grandchildren to apply only if the testator's children predeceased him was the
result of drafting error); In re Padula, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at 33, col. 2 (Surr.
Ct.) (involving drafter's affidavit which stated that mistaken inclusion of the
words "per stirpes" was the result of his use of a computer form document); In re
Jaffe, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1995, at 32, col. 1 (Surr. Ct.) (involving drafter's affidavit
which affirmed that "not" was inadvertently included in dispositive language).
But see In re Burkett, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 7, 1997, at 27, col. 4 (Surr. Ct.) (involving, in
unopposed application by decedent's family to reform will to qualify two disposi-
tions for the estate tax marital deduction, drafter's affidavit which stated that
reformation would not be inconsistent with decedents intent but fell short of say-
ing that decedent intended will provisions to qualify for estate tax marital
deduction).
210. Erickson v. Erickson, No. CV 960387780S, 1999 WL 1063260 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 4, 1999); Conn. Junior Republic v. Doherty, 478 N.E.2d 735 (Mass. App. Ct.
1985).
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to defend the suit. Furthermore, there may be non-financial reasons
to avoid litigation including faith that the system will produce the cor-
rect result without their participation and concerns about family or
other inter-personal harmony. For these reasons, named beneficiaries
cannot necessarily be relied upon to ensure that accurately expressed
intent is defended with available extrinsic evidence.
For these reasons, reliance on reputational concerns alone to add
special credibility to the lawyer's testimony appears questionable.
This does not suggest that malpractice liability is necessary to protect
testators' accurately expressed wishes, but it does highlight the impor-
tance of a substitute mechanism for assuring adequate protection of
accurately expressed wishes.
3. Standard of Proof in Malpractice Cases
If the standard of proof for malpractice and reformation claims is
identical, reformation may obviate malpractice liability entirely. If,
however, reformation requires clear and convincing evidence, as the
Third Restatement provides, there is a category of cases that would
qualify for relief in malpractice but not reformation. Some argue that
this is illogical and unfair.21 ' In theory, it may be justified on the
grounds that the higher standard of proof provides a necessary mea-
sure of deference to the testator's expression of wishes while the lower
standard of proof is sufficient to support the imposition of liability on a
lawyer that was, more likely than not, negligent. In reality, however,
the differential creates a difficulty because courts will be loathe to
deny reformation in a case where the proof appears sufficient to estab-
lish malpractice liability. In such situations, enforcing the differential
standards means that the parties will pay to litigate a new case, the
lawyer will be out of pocket, and a beneficiary will receive a benefit he
more likely than not was never intended to have, all of which are un-
desirable. Whether courts raise the standard of proof for malpractice
liability2l 2 or lower the standard of proof for reformation, 21 3 effectua-
211. William M. McGovern, Jr., The Increasing Malpractice Liability of Will Drafters,
TR. & EsT., Dec. 1994, at 16 (arguing that it is illogical and unfair to apply differ-
ent rules in malpractice cases than those applicable in reformation cases since
the goal of both the law of wills and malpractice is to effectuate the testator's
intent); Robertson, supra note 14 (concluding higher clear and convincing stan-
dard is unnecessary in reformation cases).
212. The New Jersey Supreme Court has done just that. See Pivnick v. Beck, 762 A.2d
653 (N.J. 2000) (changing burden of proof requirements in malpractice cases to
the clear and convincing standard).
213. Langbein's study of cases decided under South Australia's dispensing power re-
vealed that courts admitted to probate instruments falling short of the statutorily
required quantum of evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to facili-
tate correction of execution errors. Langbein, supra note 26. Langbein approved
of this flexibility and urged that the statute be revised to authorize relief based
on the lesser standard of clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 53. In accordance
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tion of intent becomes secondary to protection of the negligent lawyer.
Thus, unification of the standards of proof in these proceedings is
desirable.
C. Impact on the System-Administrative Cost
Administrative cost, one of the justifications offered in support of
the historic approach, 2 14 merits brief mention. To the extent reforma-
tion opens avenues of litigation, the burden on courts and the cost to
deflect nuisance suits will increase.2 15 One might question the desira-
bility of incurring this cost on the grounds that society would bear the
cost of providing judicial resources to discern intent while only those
wealthy enough to litigate would enjoy the benefits. This is particu-
larly true in the case of tax-motivated reformations which involve only
the very wealthiest of citizens. 21 6 If, however, the costs produce a
greater ability to effectuate intent, then they arguably may be justi-
fied on the same grounds that the enormous costs of construction are
justified.2 17
with the recommendation, the statute was amended to lower the standard of
proof. Wills (Misc.) Amendment Act (1994) (S.A.), reported in AN ANNUAL SURvEY
OF AUSTRALIAN LAw 1994 (Robert Baxt & Anthony P. Moore eds.) (reducing bur-
den of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to the balance of the probabilities).
While Langbein himself would not approve of a similar reduction in the context of
reformation from the clear and convincing standard to a preponderance standard,
see supra note 33, it would be difficult for appellate courts to enforce the standard
in light of the deference given to trial courts' determinations about credibility of
witnesses and fact findings generally.
214. Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 2000).
215. But cf Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road of Probate Reform: Finding the
Way to Your Will (A Response to Professor Ascher), 77 MINN. L. REV. 659 (1993)
(disputing the argument that intent-driven reforms in the Uniform Probate Code
will increase litigation). Langbein probably would argue that the opportunity to
reform will not increase the overall level of litigation but rather will focus ex-
isting litigation squarely on the testator's intent rather than on the threshold
question of whether an ambiguity exists to justify the remedy of construction. Cf
Langbein, supra note 22 (arguing that substantial compliance doctrine will not
increase litigation but rather will focus litigation of the question of intent rather
than technical compliance with wills act formalities). Others would disagree. See
Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More Like
the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1993); Bonfield, supra note 28.
216. I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN (1996), Table 16, available at http-//www.
irs.gov/tax-stats/soi/soi-bul.html (indicating that less than two percent of dece-
dents will file estate tax returns in 1996).
217. See GEORGE E. GARDNER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WILLS (photo. reprint 1999)
(1903) (devoting eight of 24 chapters to construction). More than a century ago,
the reason for the "great and growing host" of construction cases was described as
follows:
So long as the world lasts, those diversely interested will dispute the
meaning of written phrases on which turn their several pecuniary
rights; and no [writing] can be more fruitful of litigation [than a will]
.... The law itself fosters uncertainty in such cases by refusing to sub-
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Demanding empirical evidence of the benefit of the inquiry into in-
tent in the case of unambiguous wills is too stringent a standard to
satisfy. Any modification to the historic approach should be supporta-
ble, however, with cogent reasons for believing that the benefit af-
forded by the change will justify the cost.
IV. THE PROPOSAL
The policy arguments discussed in the preceding section do not
support one of the three approaches discussed to the exclusion of the
others. The utilitarian rationale for testamentary freedom favors def-
erence to the testator's will but also supports correction of mistake in
situations where the testator in fact erred. Professional responsibility
considerations support adherence to the will as written, but the rem-
edy of malpractice is problematic. Cost considerations support adher-
ence to the will as written as well, but rejection of the remedy on the
grounds of cost is inconsistent with the availability of construction
relief.
As Part II illustrates, neither a rule nor a standard alone ad-
dresses these competing considerations well. The historic no-reforma-
tion rule relies exclusively (if strictly applied) or at least heavily (if
progressively applied) on the testator and his lawyer to avoid error in
the first instance, leaving a court with little or no capability to con-
sider relevant information ferreted out by interested parties that the
testator may have overlooked. The Third Restatement standard leans
heavily in the opposite direction, providing relief for mistake when rel-
evant information has been overlooked but leaving the testator with
no means of definitively conveying that the will, as written, accurately
expresses his intent.
To better accommodate both groups, Part IV proposes a bifurcated
approach to reformation which includes both a flexible standard per-
mitting broad relief for mistake and a rule that requires deference to
the will as written. The crux of this proposal lies in the method of
differentiating those wills that are subject to reformation from those
that are not. Rather than requiring the testator (with or without
counsel) to determine whether a mistake exists before the will is exe-
cuted, as the historic approach does, or mandating deferral of the de-
termination to the time the will becomes effective when the testator is
unavailable to explicate his wishes, as the Third Restatement re-
quires, the proposal permits the testator to elect the time at which the
issue of mistake is addressed, subject to an indefeasible judicial au-
ject this class of instruments to rigid rules of construction, but making
what it may of a testator's language, [being] slovenly and illiterate as it
may; our policy being to give the greatest possible scope to each dying
[testator's] wishes, provided he executed his will with due formalities.
JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF WILLS § 461 (3d ed. 1900).
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thority to reform wills after death that fail to satisfy specific pre-es-
tablished criteria designed to protect against ill-advised decisions to
preclude reformation. In effect, the proposal constitutes a privately
adaptable rule which allows the testator to select the approach to ref-
ormation that will best suit his needs as he perceives them.
The proposal enhances the opportunity to realize the promise of
testamentary freedom (disposition of property at death in accordance
with the testator's actual wishes) by conferring on testators the oppor-
tunity to determine the means by which those dispositive wishes are
communicated: through the will alone (in cases where the testator
precludes reformation) or through the will coupled with extrinsic evi-
dence (in cases where the testator elects reformation). The direct con-
nection between effectuation of actual testamentary wishes and
control over the means of communicating them compels recognition of
reformation as a component of dispositive choice over which the testa-
tor ought to have absolute authority. If one choice or the other may be
unwise in particular cases, a conclusion difficult to reach without em-
pirical data, the law appropriately may discourage, but should not
foreclose, that option. Thus, if, as the Third Restatement drafters ap-
parently believe, courts generally are able to ascertain intent better
than testators are able to express it, will reformation doctrine should
encourage testators to elect to subject their wills to reformation with-
out forcing the decision upon them.
Under the proposal, the standard of proof required to merit refor-
mation, pursuant to either the testator's affirmative election or the
indefeasible judicial authority to reform, would be the preponderance
standard. There would be no particularity requirement, thus facilitat-
ing and validating reliance on imputed intent outcomes that comport
with common sense as well as eliminating the distinction between
probable and actual intent. The difficult task of policing evidentiary
determinations as the Third Restatement requires would be unneces-
sary because testators who perceive themselves to be the likely vic-
tims of inaccurate determinations would have the opportunity to
preclude the inquiry into intent. Consequently, the proof require-
ments for malpractice, reformation and construction could be unified
without reducing the ability to exercise effectively testamentary
freedom.
The precise parameters of the proposal, together with the justifica-
tions for the balancing of interests reflected by the parameters, are
discussed below. Section A addresses the optional prong of the bifur-
cated system while section B addresses the mandatory prong. In sec-
tion C, anticipated criticisms of the proposal are evaluated.
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A. Optional Reformation
Optional reformation would be available under the proposal for all
errors in the expression of testamentary intent as well as those arising
from misunderstanding of the factual circumstances or governing law
if the testator elects to avail himself of the opportunity for this relief.
A critical facet of this bifurcated approach to reformation is the impo-
sition of the burden to opt into reformation relief rather than requir-
ing testators who seek the benefit of the safe harbor to opt out of
reformation relief. Also important is the manner of opting in and the
extent to which the testator may define the parameters of any inquiry
into intent if reformation is authorized.
1. Opting In Versus Opting Out
In order to maximize testamentary freedom in the aggregate, a bi-
furcated approach to reformation ought to incorporate as the default
approach the one that would benefit the majority of testators and im-
pose the burden of electing into the alternative approach on the mi-
nority group. Without empirical information about the frequency of
mistakes in wills and the extent to which a liberalized reformation
doctrine actually relieves them, it is impossible to know, with cer-
tainty, whether deference to the will as written or liberal relief would
be the optimal default. In the absence of this information, the selec-
tion of one approach as the default should be balanced with the
broadest possible safeguards to maximize the opportunity to select, in-
telligently, the opposite choice.
Two factors weigh in favor of requiring confident testators to opt
out of reformation relief rather than requiring testators who contem-
plate the possibility of error to opt in. First, to the extent the need for
the safe harbor arises from atypicality rather than an assumption
about limitations on courts' ability to ascertain actual intent accu-
rately, the majority would be benefited by an opt out approach. Sec-
ond, many testators may assume relief is unnecessary without
carefully considering the possibilities for error. For these reasons, it
would be reasonable to assume that an opt out approach would maxi-
mize testamentary freedom in the aggregate. Counterveiling factors,
however, outweigh the justifications for an opt out approach, which
drive the proposal's adoption of an opt in approach coupled with lib-
eral protections to minimize the possibility of ill-advised decisions
about optional reformation.
First, an opt out approach is conceptually inconsistent with a pre-
existing power to reform. If a will is, in the first instance, subject to
reformation, then the inclusion of a provision expressing the desire to
opt out of reformation relief itself could be found to be the product of
mistake and thus subject to reformation. The protection offered by
such language in an opt out system could reduce the likelihood of in-
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tent-defeating reformation, but it could not preclude an inquiry into
intent leading to reformation of an accurate will. A statute could man-
date absolute deference to opt out language, but the force of such a
statute would be questionable in light of the general rejection of the
prohibition against reformation embodied in the opt out approach.
An opt in system, on the other hand, is conceptually consistent
with courts' traditional, if not unfailing, deference to the language of
unambiguous wills. If wills continue to be exempt from reformation,
then they will be subject to re-writing only when a valid election is in
place. A court may reform or disregard an opt in election, but this
should preclude reformation in the absence of an election, indicating a
desire to subject the will to re-writing.
Another important value an opt in approach provides that an opt
out approach cannot is incentive to consider the possibility of mistake
in the planning process. By requiring an opt in for reformation relief,
lawyers seeking to obviate malpractice claims would have to persuade
their clients to opt in. To do this, the subject of mistake would have to
be discussed, and this itself would encourage lawyer and client to fo-
cus on the possibility of mistake, thereby avoiding some mistakes that
otherwise would occur. In contrast, an opt out approach would create
an incentive for lawyers to gloss over or omit entirely discussion of the
possibility of mistake and potential remedies, reducing testators' abil-
ity to choose intelligently and creating the false impression that testa-
tors' wishes will be respected as written.
Finally, an opt in approach leaves in place as the default rule the
current approach to reformation of testamentary instruments. This
eliminates the possibility that introduction of the elective system em-
bodied in the proposal itself will create errors in wills drafted by those
who are unaware of this change in the law.
2. Manner of, and Parameters for, Opting In
The means by which a testator conveys the intent to permit refor-
mation is an important part of a reformation doctrine premised on ex-
press consent. One possibility is to permit a simple statement in the
will affirming a desire to permit reformation, but this approach risks
the possibility that such a provision may be included as form language
without specific consideration by the testator. To preclude that risk,
as well as the risk of litigation over the question whether the provision
was included as boilerplate or as the result of specific consideration by
the testator, the indication of an intent to opt in should be set forth in
a writing separate from the will itself.218 Formalities for this writing
218. The lawyer's personal interest in a testamentary decision of the client supports
the imposition of a special disclosure in the context of fiduciary appointments for
the drafting attorney. See N.Y. SuRa. CT. PRoc. ACT § 2307-a (McKinney 1997)
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should parallel those required for will execution with an option to util-
ize alternative formalities that fulfill the same cautionary function.219
Requiring a separate writing also presents the question whether a
new writing must be executed when a new will or codicil is executed.
There are sound reasons for requiring re-execution of the instrument
granting the reformation power with each will execution. A change
that prompts the re-execution of the will may cause a change of view
about the desirability of the grant of the reformation authority. Fur-
ther, a change in lawyers could impact the desirability of a reforma-
tion power. A testator might be comfortable granting the reformation
power for instruments drafted by a trusted confidant whose testi-
mony, if available, would likely correspond to the testator's actual
desires but less comfortable granting the power for instruments
drafted by a lawyer with whom the testator was less familiar. Alter-
natively, the testator might be comfortable without the reformation
power for instruments drafted by a lawyer in whom he had great con-
fidence but less sanguine about the absence of the reformation power
for an instrument drafted by a different lawyer. These concerns jus-
tify the requirement to execute a new reformation authorization with
each new will.
While the concerns could apply when a codicil is executed as well,
it is far less likely that they will because lawyers typically do not draft
codicils to instruments they themselves did not prepare. Moreover,
the advent of word processing has probably limited the use of codicils
largely to those situations in which there is an affirmative reason to
continue to rely on a previously executed will such as a change in the
law that is tied to the date of execution of a will or an increased risk of
challenge based on capacity at the time the changes to the will are
(requiring written disclosure in cases where the drafter of an instrument is ap-
pointed as fiduciary under it to inform the creator that (i) subject to limited statu-
tory exceptions, persons other than lawyers may serve as fiduciaries, (ii)
fiduciaries are compensated in accordance with statutory schedules, and (iii) that
the legal fees incurred in connection with estate administration are separate
from fiduciary commissions). Although the statute does not expressly so state,
the intent seems to have been to require a writing separate from the document
under which the appointment was made. See In re Estate of Pacanofsky, 714
N.Y.S.2d 433 (Surr. Ct. 2000). Contra In re Estate of Winston, 717 N.Y.S.2d 879
(Surr. Ct. 2000) (holding that the disclosure requirements may be satisfied by the
content of the appointing document itself where the court concludes that the dis-
closure contemplated by the statute was in fact made). In the attorney-fiduciary
context, disclosure is a practical alternative to a prohibition against drafting an
instrument appointing the drafter as fiduciary. In the reformation context, elimi-
nation of the attorney's conflict by requiring a separate drafter would be even
more onerous because the client would be unable to avoid the use of two lawyers
for the preparation of a will.
219. Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503, 8 U.L. 146 (1998) (dispensing power allowing
recognition of writings intended to constitute wills as wills so long as the intent is
clear even if all formalities required are not observed).
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desired. For these reasons, new reformation authorization would not
be required for execution of a codicil, and the authority granted to re-
form a will would extend to codicils to it.
Granting the testator the power to determine whether or not to
permit reformation of his will raises the question of the extent to
which the testator can control reformation proceedings. For example,
may he preclude specified types of evidence, change the standard of
proof so that reformation is permitted only if a higher standard is met,
or allow reformation of only certain types of errors or specified provi-
sions in his will? A desire to permit reformation based only on a
higher standard of proof such as clear and convincing evidence would
be understandable, and the opportunity to preclude the testimony of
particular individuals whom the testator believes would present a dis-
torted picture of intent might be understandable as well. Certainly
the desire to authorize tax reformations while precluding inquiry into
wholly substantive dispositions is to be expected.
On the other hand, the enormous complications that could occur if
the parameters of the reformations permitted were designed over-
zealously, inartfully or unwisely are easy to imagine. Conceptualizing
the choice to opt into reformation relief as the extension of communi-
cative authority from the testator to other individuals who may pre-
sent evidence of testamentary intent at his death would suggest that
the testator should be able to tailor the parameters of reformation to
his wishes. The basic goal of the proposed reformation approach does
not, however, require this result. Sufficient communicative authority
exists so long as a safe harbor is available to preclude consideration of
communications over which the testator has no control; if he avails
himself of the benefit of extrinsic evidence, he must accept it in its
entirety with two exceptions.
First, the testator would be permitted to restrict the reformation
authority to applications designed to achieve a tax benefit. The need
for tax reformations, particularly in light of the possibility of retroac-
tive tax changes,220 suggests that such a power would be desirable for
many who would not necessarily wish to invite re-evaluation of their
dispositive choices in general.
Second, the testator would be permitted, but not required, to desig-
nate a person who would serve as the testator's proxy for advising the
court of intent. By allowing the testator to select a proxy, the testator
220. See, e.g., In re Estate of Branigan, 609 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1992) (authorizing reforma-
tion to reflect changes in generation-skipping tax enacted after execution of dece-
dent's will and additional revisions enacted after decedent's death); accord In re
Estate of Nossiter, 552 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Surr. Ct. 1990) (same); In re Burden,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 1997, at 27, col. 1 (Surr. Ct.) (authorizing reformation to re-
flect changes in estate tax marital deduction availability for non-citizen spouses
enacted after decedent's death).
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could identify for the court the individual whom the testator viewed as
the best source of information about his intent and express himself
through a living person in the reformation proceeding.221 This may,
but need not, be the drafter. With the two roles segregated, the testi-
mony of the drafter will receive extraordinary weight only in those
situations where it is most appropriate, minimizing the possibility of
over-correction as would otherwise be likely in Case 4.222
3. Sample Authorization Form
Disclosure of reformation authority as contemplated by the propo-
sal would take the following form:
AUTHORIZATION TO CHANGE PROVISIONS OF MY WILL
I, _ have executed a will dated
1. I believe that the will accurately and clearly expresses my wishes.
2. I understand that if my will INACCURATELY expresses my wishes due
to typographical error, legal error on the part of my lawyer, or misunder-
standing of my factual situation, either on the part of my lawyer or my-
self, my intended beneficiaries may have NO opportunity to change the
221. This proposal bears some similarity to the following suggestion made several
years ago by Professor Casner:
Flexibility in an estate plan to meet changing conditions can be achieved
today to some extent by the use of discretionary powers in a trustee and
by giving powers of appointment to various beneficiaries. It ought to be
possible, however, for a donor of property to select a person in whom he
or she has confidence, and in effect say to that person you develop an
appropriate plan for the disposition of my accumulated wealth within six
months after my death. I shall give you a general outline of the objec-
tives I have in mind but your decision shall be binding on all concerned.
This would be similar to a durable power of attorney that it is now possi-
ble to give another person to make gifts of such person's property during
such person's lifetime, even though the owner of the property becomes
mentally incompetent. I can see a possible future as permitting a dura-
ble power of attorney extending for a limited time into the post-death
period under which the holder of the power may make appropriate dona-
tive arrangements of the decedent's accumulated wealth. These changes
would relate back to the donor's death for all purposes, as though they
had been made by the decedent before he in fact died.
A. James Casner, Estate Planning-Past, Present, and Possibly a Different Fu-
ture (Mar. 9, 1989), reprinted in 15 PROB. LAw. (Summer 1989), at 18. The
Casner approach is broader than the proposal because it contemplates an author-
ity akin to a power of appointment that would vest the possessor of the authority
with complete control to determine the testator's wishes rather than a mere advi-
sory role in assisting the court in the discernment of the testator's intent. The
more modest proposal set forth in the text would be preferable for those testators
who prefer not to give one individual absolute control over the dispositive plan;
those who may be concerned that the person or persons who they believe are most
familiar with their dispositive plans may predecease; and those who would grant
power to one who is beneficially interested in the estate.
222. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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provisions of my will unless I agree to confer upon the court a power to
reform my will.
3. I understand that if I do NOT confer upon the court a power to reform my
will, and my will is INACCURATE, my intended beneficiaries may suc-
cessfully sue my lawyer in a malpractice action if the inaccuracy results
from his negligence. I understand that if the inaccuracy results from my
own misinformation or other error, my intended beneficiaries will not be
entitled to recover from my lawyer.
4. Based upon the information stated in this form, I choose the following-
- I DO NOT authorize the court to reform my will (if this option is
selected, form need not be completed)
- I AUTHORIZE the court to reform my will ONLY for purposes of
securing a tax benefit which I understand may decrease the share of
the estate that one or more beneficiaries receive for the good of the
estate as a whole
- I AUTHORIZE the court to reform ANY PROVISION of my will in
order to effectuate my intent as the court understands it based upon
all of the evidence presented to it
5. I understand that I have the option to designate an individual (known as
my proxy) who, in my view, is most likely to advise the court accurately as
to my dispositive intentions in the event a proceeding is brought to reform
my will. I understand that the designation of a proxy will express my
wish for the court to give the proxy's testimony special weight, but that
the court is not bound to reform (or refuse to reform) my will in accordance
with my proxy's view about my actual intent. I understand that this indi-
vidual may, but need not, be my lawyer.
- I choose not to designate a proxy.
6 _ I designate - as my proxy.
6. 1 understand that the reformation authorization conferred by this form
will extend to any codicils I execute to supplement this will.
[signature]
[witness]
This form sets forth the basic factors important in deciding
whether reformation may be desirable without excessive detail. The
form itself does not (and cannot) explain, much less analyze, all fac-
tors relevant in the decision whether to allow reformation, and it
therefore requires elaboration by a competent lawyer. The form does,
however, alert the testator to the basic choice and its potential conse-
quences, thus giving the testator enough information to ask intelligent
questions, or if appropriate, seek out a different lawyer who will ex-
plain the choice in a manner that he comprehends.
B. Mandatory Reformation: Mischief or Mistake
Offsetting the possibility of an ill-advised choice to preclude refor-
mation (or a failure to elect resulting from ignorance of the option) is
the inclusion of an indefeasible power to reform in cases where mis-
take may be presumed without infringing on dispositive choice. These
would include all cases in which only mischief or mistake could ex-
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plain the disposition as determined under pre-defined presumptions
refutable by will. In these cases, there is no justification for adhering
to the will, as written, because mistake ought to be remedied and mis-
chief ought not to be sanctioned. Intentionally executing an instru-
ment containing provisions that violate the rule against perpetuities,
for example, may serve some fraudulent purpose or tickle an odd
sense of humor, but indulgence of these desires is unnecessary to ful-
fill the promise of testamentary freedom. This is more liberal than the
Third Restatement approach, which, ironically, permits reformation of
wills not certain to correct mistake and yet may preclude reformation
of wills where mistake unequivocally occurred.2 23
The presumption of mistake would extend to any case where the
will failed, in whole or in part, to dispose of the estate, giving effect to
all default rules embodied in the law of wills. Intestacy statutes,
which currently govern disposition of property ineffectively disposed
of by will, would be disregarded. The primary justification for differ-
entiating the intestacy statute from other default rules is that other
default rules are specifically designed for those who leave wills and
reliance on them is both expected and efficient. 224 Intestacy statutes,
in contrast, are not tailored to the unique circumstances of those who
leave wills, and it is presumed that they will be inapplicable to estates
of testators who leave valid wills:2 2 5
223. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
224. Corrective statutes are efficient in that they obviate the necessity for a new will
when the modification provided by statute is consistent with the testator's actual
desires. A reformation system that precluded reliance on these statutes would
require execution of a new will to confirm the statutorily presumed intent or al-
ternatively a recitation that all corrective statutes in effect on the date of the will
execution were intended to apply. To impose this burden is to assume that the
remedies provided by the corrective statutes are too questionable to apply with-
out further inquiry. Some courts appear to adopt this view, but if the view is
sound, testators and their lawyers should not be misled by the existence of the
corrective statutes. See Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892 (N.J. 1977) (declining to
apply statutory reversal of "no residue of a residue" rule based on extrinsic evi-
dence suggesting that testator would prefer a different approach); In re Estate of
Tateo, 768 A.2d 243 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (declining to apply statutory
default scheme for abatement based on extrinsic evidence suggesting that testa-
tor would prefer a different approach).
225. See generally PAGE ON WrLLs, supra note 29, § 30.14 (noting constructional pref-
erence against intestacy). This is incorporated into the Third Restatement's pro-
visions relating to construction. THnm RESTATEmENT, supra note 9, § 11.3(c)(2).
In addition to this general construction preference, courts also avoid partial in-
testacy for decedents who leave wills by concluding that the failure to dispose of
all property by will creates a latent ambiguity. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wood, 226
So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); In re Martin, 262 So. 2d 46 (La. Ct. App.
1972); Greer v. Anderson, 259 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953). These doc-
trines, of course, do not avoid application of intestacy in all cases of ineffective
disposition. See supra note 147. See generally, Annotation, Proper Disposition
Under Will Providing for Allocation of Express Percentages or Proportions
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Also within the scope of presumed mistake would be any devise,
including a pre-residuary devise, subject to an unfulfilled condition
stated in the will that is not otherwise expressly disposed of pursuant
to the will or corrective statute. A situation involving an allegation
that the testator intended to impose a condition unexpressed in the
will would be outside the presumption of mistake as would a disposi-
tion that is initially effective but voided by corrective statute.226 An
example of a will falling within the scope of presumed mistake would
be one which establishes a trust, conditions the remainder interest on
survivorship of the life beneficiary, and fails to dispose of the remain-
der interest in the event the named remainderman fails to satisfy the
survivorship condition. Another example would be a devise to a bene-
ficiary "if he survives me" with no express designation of an alternate
beneficiary and to which no anti-lapse statute is applicable. In these
cases, pre-residuary devises typically would pass under the residuary
clause in the absence of reformation, a result that sometimes but not
always effectuates actual intent.
Expanding the scope of presumed mistake beyond provisions that
are nugatory at the time of execution, such as Cases 1227 and 2,228
imposes a significant burden on testators who seek to avoid
mandatory reformation. These testators will be unable to rely on the
intestacy statute or the residuary clause to cover contingencies not ex-
pressly addressed in the will; instead they must expressly state that
they intend all pre-residuary devises not otherwise effectively dis-
posed of pass to the residuary beneficiaries, and any bequest not effec-
tively disposed of by the residuary clause to pass in intestacy. This is
especially significant because it effectively changes the meaning of a
residuary disposition from one disposing of all property not otherwise
devised under the will to one disposing of property only to the extent
that the will expressly contemplates disposition of that property pur-
suant to the residuary clause. Imposing this burden on testators who
seek to avoid reformation is justified, however, for several reasons.
First, the burden already exists under current law to the extent
that failure to address a contingency may (but will not necessarily) be
remedied by a sympathetic court that ostensibly is constrained to ap-
ply the historic approach. 229 By expressly including these types of dis-
Amounting to More or Less Than Whole of Residuary Estate, 35 A.L.R.4th 788
(1985).
226. See, e.g., UNip. PR BATE. CODE § 2-804, 8 U.L.A. 217-19 (1998) (stating that dis-
position to spouse divorced from testator after will execution is void).
227. See supra note 90.
228. See supra note 99.
229. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The doctrine of gifts by implication,
for example, allows the court to infer the disposition intended for the unad-
dressed contingency in cases where the terms of the will admit but one conclusion
about the testator's intent. See, e.g., Bishop Trust Co., Ltd. v. Jacobs, 36 Haw.
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positions within the ambit of presumed mistake, drafters are alerted
to the possibility that failing to expressly dispose of the entire estate
may create an issue as to intent. An ancillary benefit is that differen-
tiating unaddressed contingencies, incorporated into the definition of
presumed mistake, from express use of legal or colloquial language,
not so incorporated, may reduce the tendency to categorize clear but
puzzling dispostive choices as ambiguous,2 30 strengthening the bene-
fit of the safe harbor.23 1 This would be consistent with judicial deci-
sions that have expressed a willingness to liberalize reformation
relief.
2 3 2
Another justification for burdening the testator who seeks to pre-
clude reformation with the obligation to draft in a manner that fore-
closes mandatory reformation is that his decision to opt out conveys a
sense of confidence in the will's articulation of his wishes. If this confi-
dence is justified, he will be aware of the scope of the presumed mis-
take provision of reformation and able to secure a will that avoids it.
If the drafter (whether the testator himself or a lawyer) is unable to
draft in a manner that avoids the presumed mistake provision, the
drafter is unlikely to have sufficient knowledge about other default
rules to prepare a will that unambiguously expresses the testator's
actual intent.23 3 In this case, the testator's confidence would be un-
314 (1942); Erwin v. Kruse, 161 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 1959); In re Estate of Carpenter,
533 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1995); In re Abraham, 136 So. 2d 471 (La. Ct. App. 1962);
First Portland Natl Bank v. Kaler-Vaill Mem'1 Home, 151 A.2d 708 (Me. 1959);
In re Bieley, 695 N.E.2d 1119 (N.Y. 1998); In re Will of Bruckheimer, 173
N.Y.S.2d 655 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In re Estate of Hunt, 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992).
Just when the will admits of a single conclusion about intent is difficult to pre-
dict. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kronen, 496 N.E.2d 678 (N.Y. 1986). Including
these cases within the category of presumed mistake obviates the difficulties in-
herent in the doctrine of gifts by implication.
230. See supra note 95 (discussing Third Restatement's characterization as an ambi-
guity a devise to a named individual on the grounds that the descriptor "friend"
might fit a similarly named individual better).
231. The Third Restatement itself does not provide that an alleged failure to under-
stand a legally defined term constitutes an ambiguity, but logic would seem to
require that it should because the decedent is more likely to know, and certainly
more capable of ascertaining, the name of his intended beneficiary than he is the
consequences of legal terms and phrases. Such an expansive definition of ambi-
guity is inconsistent with the proposal because it effectively would preclude the
right to insulate a will from re-interpretation based on extrinsic evidence.
232. See Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998) (holding that alleged misun-
derstanding of failure to opt out of corrective statute did not create ambiguity);
Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 2000) (holding that alleged mis-
understanding of legal effect of failing to name contingent beneficiaries did not
create an ambiguity; concurrence noted that, though Massachusetts had not yet
adopted reformation doctrine, court would be amenable in an appropriate case).
233. This is similar to the obligation imposed by the 1990 revisions to the UPC anti-
lapse statute. Under the prior statute, conditioning the bequest with the lan-
guage "if he survives me" was thought by many to preclude application of the
anti-lapse statute. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
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justified, and reformation, contrary to his own assessment, would be
in his best interest.
1. Illustrative Cases Within the Scope of Mischief or Mistake
Of the illustrative cases discussed in Part I, Case 1,234 the crossed
will execution, Case 2,235 the perpetuities violation, Case 3,236 the tax
error, and Case 6,237 the failure to dispose of real property, would
qualify for reformation automatically regardless of the testator's de-
sire to limit the court to the provisions of the will because each case
involves a will that is wholly or partially ineffective at the time of exe-
cution. In each of these cases, one or more of the will's provisions can
never become fully operative, and inquiry into intent is likely to effec-
tuate actual wishes.
Case 5,238 the situation in which the corrective statute designed to
protect surviving spouses who married after the will execution de-
prived the spouse of more generous testamentary provisions, should
not arise under the proposal because the corrective statute (now re-
pealed)239 is inconsistent with it. The proposal presumes mistake in
cases where the will results in an intestate distribution that is not
expressly required, and the corrective statute, providing for intestate
distribution, would place the will within the realm of presumed mis-
UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1105
(1992) (stating most cases hold that mere words of survivorship automatically or
presumptively defeat the anti-lapse statute); Ascher, supra note 215. But see
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603, 8 U.L.A. 168 (1998) ("Lawyers who believe that the
attachment of words of survivorship to a devise is a foolproof method of defeating
an antilapse statute are mistaken."). Under the statute as revised, the testator
must refute expressly the presumed intent for the statute to apply using lan-
guage other than "if he survives me." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (amended
1993), 8 U.L.A. 164 (1998). This revision, like the presumed mistake provision of
the reformation proposal advocated here, complicates will drafting for the benefit
of those who may fail to understand the consequences of the language (or absence
of it) employed in the will. This policy decision has not gone unquestioned. See
Ascher, supra note 215. The approach to reformation proposed here is subject to
the same criticism: changing default rules may increase the incidence of drafting
mistake for the benefit of those who could not properly apply simpler rules. The
validity of this criticism depends, however, upon the argument that increasing
the difficulty of drafting an unambiguous will is more inconsistent with the ratio-
nale underlying testamentary freedom than is denying relief for those who err.
For the reasons articulated in Part III, this Article rejects that contention.
234. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 99.
236. See supra note 109.
237. See supra note 144.
238. See supra note 132.
239. See supra note 133. The repeal of the then existing omitted spouse statute was
accompanied by enactment of a new statute that follows the more typical ap-
proach. 21 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-257a (West Supp. 2001) (following gen-
eral parameters of the original UPC, see infra note 240).
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take, a nonsensical result. A more typical omitted spouse statute
would provide the spouse with a right to a fraction of the estate equal
to the intestate share, 24 0 and that type of statute would not disturb
the estate plan in Case 5 which provided more generously for the sur-
viving spouse.
Also within the mischief or mistake provision would be a disposi-
tion to a beneficiary deceased at the time of the will execution. 2 4 1 Al-
though such a disposition might be saved by an anti-lapse statute,
2 42
the disposition itself, ineffective at the time of execution, would not be
intentionally included for any legitimate purpose.2 43 Similarly, relief
would be available in cases like In re Estate of Ikuta24 4 in which refor-
mation was sought to substitute the word "youngest" for "oldest" in a
clause providing for the termination of a testamentary trust upon the
death of the last survivor of two named individuals or when the "oldst
[sic] of my sons attains the age of 30 years, whichever event occurs
first." At the time of the will execution, the decedent's oldest son was
already 30 years old, thus rendering the trust nugatory from the mo-
ment of execution. 24 5 Consequently, no legitimate purpose could be
served by adhering to this language.
240. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301, 8 U.LA. 317 (1998) (providing spouse who
married testator after execution of his will with the same share of the estate she
would have received if the decedent left no will unless it appears from the will
that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for her by transfer
outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary pro-
vision is shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer
or other evidence). Later revisions to the UPC reduce the share of the spouse
who married the testator after execution of the will by calculating the intestate
share based on only that portion of the estate that does not pass to a child born
before the testator married the spouse who is not a child of the spouse or descend-
ants of such a child either directly or pursuant to anti-lapse or other corrective
statutes. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-214 (revised 1993), 8 U.L.A. 131 (1998).
241. Historically, the law distinguished between void devises, which were designated
for beneficiaries who died prior to execution of the will, and lapsed devises, which
were designated for beneficiaries alive at the time of the will execution but prede-
ceased the testator. Generally no consequences attach to the distinction and the
Third Restatement, therefore, advocates its elimination of the distinction itself.
RESTATEMENT (THImD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANsFERs § 5.5 cmt. a (1999). This
distinction would retain importance under this mischief or mistake standard.
242. See supra note 38.
243. An exception to this generalization would be required for those anti-lapse stat-
utes that apply to members included in a class disposition who are predeceased at
the time of the will execution. See, e.g., UNrIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-605, 8 U.L.A.
423 (1998). In such a case, the general provision allowing reliance on corrective
statutes should apply so that the deceased class member's issue would take, and
the will would not be deemed to include a mistake. Of course, the will could qual-
ify for relief under the opt in provisions discussed in section A if the testator so
elected.
244. 639 P.2d 400 (Haw. 1981).
245. Id. at 406.
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Tax cases would be evaluated based on the same mischief or mis-
take standard with the express recognition that a will failing to qual-
ify for beneficial tax treatment would be deemed partially ineffective
to the extent that it passes a portion of the estate to the government
that is unnecessary to fulfill the dispositions to the named benefi-
ciaries in the will. This does not preclude testators' ability to ensure
that a plan intentionally foregoing a tax benefit is effective; it merely
requires him to state this intention expressly in the will. This burden
is justifiable on the grounds that, apart from tax reformation cases,
current law requires testators to express unequivocally that the gov-
ernment is intended as a beneficiary in order to preclude inquiry into
intent.246
If, however, securing the tax benefit would require any alteration
of dispositive provisions, relief would be available under mandatory
reformation only if the intent to secure the tax benefit was manifested
directly or indirectly in the will, thus constituting a proper case for
construction; all other changes to dispositive provisions sought to se-
cure tax benefits would require an election for optional reformation as
described in Section A.247 This is more restrictive than the current
law of some jurisdictions 24s or the Third Restatement approach.249
The justification is that the nearly universal desire to minimize tax
burdens does not translate into the desire to utilize any particular
planning technique. Weighing the benefits of the tax savings against
the modifications to the dispositive plan involves some measure of ob-
jectivity, but there is no basis upon which to conclude the dispositive
desires of the testator whose plan is at stake would conform to this
quasi-objective assessment.250 The evaluation of the desirability of
the dispositive modification could incorporate a normative aspect
which could work to defeat the testator's desires. Accordingly, relief
246. Compare In re Bertram, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 2000, at 32, col. 2 (Surr. Ct.) (involving
testamentary trust expressly providing for distribution to U.S. government), with
In re Trust of Brooke, 697 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio 1998) (construing bequest to a village
as a charitable bequest to the citizens rather than a bequest to the village itself).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 218-222.
248. See supra note 87.
249. See supra note 82.
250. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burdon-Muller, 456 A-2d 1266 (Me. 1983) (regarding de-
termination of percentage of partially charitable ("split interest") testator in-
tended for charity to receive could not be based solely on maximizing the estate
tax charitable deduction). Cf., James W. Narron, Non-Charitable Inter Vivos
Gifts-A Plan for Tax Relief, 34 UNIv. OF MIAMI PHILIP E. HECKLERING INST. ON
EST. PLAN. 15-1, 15-26 (2000) (noting that a "myriad of personal and family im-
ponderables that defy any numerical analysis" enter into the determination
whether to make taxable transfers during life); Richard W. Nenno, Delaware Law
Offers Asset Protection and Estate Planning Benefits, 26 EST. PLAN. 3, 7 (1999)
(noting that many individuals understand that inter vivos gifts would generate
substantial transfer tax savings but nevertheless are reluctant to make them).
458 [Vol. 80:387
MY WILL BE DONE
for tax mistakes of this sort is better addressed by the optional refor-
mation provision of which the testator may choose to avail himself.
2. Illustrative Cases Outside the Scope of Mischief or Mistake
Outside the scope of mandatory reformation are tax cases requir-
ing alteration of dispositive provisions other than those qualifying for
construction relief:2 5 ' Case 4,252 the scrivener's error which, it was
revealed later, in fact represented the testator's true intent; and Case
7,253 the unanticipated circumstance addressed by corrective statute.
These cases must be excluded from the presumption of mistake in or-
der to provide a safe harbor for testators who accurately express their
wishes because, unlike Cases 1, 2, 3 and 6, there is no drafting mecha-
nism, other than a general statement of desire to preclude reforma-
tion, that could insulate an accurate will from these allegations of
error.
If Case 7 raises a generalized concern, that speaks more to the va-
lidity of the presumption underlying the corrective statute than to a
defect in the proposal. If exclusion of Case 4 from automatic relief
seems harsh, it is only because we are willing to jeopardize realization
of the testator's wishes in order to save the negligent lawyer from the
consequences of his own mistake. Moreover, in both of these cases,
relief would be available under the optional reformation provisions for
those testators choosing to avail themselves of it.
C. Potential Criticisms
No reformation doctrine can accommodate perfectly the dual
desires to remedy apparent mistakes and protect those who do not err
from erroneous realignment of their dispositive plans. A different
view of the appropriate balance between these two competing goals
will lead to a different conclusion about the desirability of the pro-
posed approach. Even for those who agree with the basic balance, the
proposal involves some drawbacks, the most apparent of which are ad-
dressed below.
251. See supra text accompanying note 30. Non-tax cases falling outside the realm of
construction, of course, would be excluded as well if they did not fall within the
definition of presumed mistake. While the presumed mistake definition is in-
tended, among other things, to reduce the desire to categorize as ambiguous une-
quivocal statements, difficult cases nevertheless would arise. See, e.g., Crisp
Area Y.M.CA v. NationsBank, N.A, 526 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 2000) (holding that char-
itable bequest to extant but inactive organization could not be reformed to benefit
the organization that assumed the functions of the named charity).
252. See supra note 124.
253. See supra note 149.
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1. Burdens on the Planning Process
The opt in approach burdens all testators at the planning stage
because it treats reformation as, in effect, a dispositive choice that,
like any other dispositive choice, requires consideration. The added
time required to discuss the desirability of opting into reformation re-
lief and the preparation of documentation effectuating the intent to
opt in will add to the pressures lawyers already face in preparing es-
tate plans at a competitive cost.25 4 The benefit of this burden, how-
ever, more than outweighs its cost. The opt in requirement for
reformation encourages lawyers to discuss the possibility of error with
clients because reformation will be available to obviate a malpractice
claim only if the client chooses to opt into reformation relief. This, in
turn, gives testators the ability to choose which approach to reforma-
tion better suits their situation rather than imposing a "one size fits
all" rule or standard as the other approaches to reformation do. Addi-
tionally, the reformation discussion heightens awareness of the limi-
tations on the estate planning process that may result in mistake and
reduces the possibility that mistakes will be made to the extent testa-
tors respond to the heightened awareness by, for example, proofread-
ing more carefully than they otherwise would. This provides similar,
albeit lesser, protection than malpractice liability while avoiding truly
unnecessary losses.
The brunt of the opt in burden will be borne most heavily by those
who draft their own wills or rely on lawyers unfamiliar with the opt in
requirement. In the case of self-drafted wills, the burden is offset to
some degree by the reduction in possibility of ministerial scrivener's
error and, in the case of form wills, the likelihood that the opt in form
would be included as part of the will drafting package. In the case of
wills drafted by lawyers, the burden is offset to a large degree by the
existence of malpractice liability to disappointed beneficiaries.25 5 In
the case of all wills, it must be recognized that no reformation doctrine
can substitute for careful planning by an experienced professional
without compromising testamentary freedom significantly.
A related criticism is that the opt in choice will be largely incom-
prehensible to clients, creating confusion and complexity for no real
benefit. Estate planning clients need not be educated or even intelli-
gent, but they must possess the capacity to understand the property
they own, the objects of their bounty and the nature of their disposi-
tions.2 56 The vast majority of clients who meet the test for capacity
(and arguably all) should be able to comprehend the possibility of mis-
254. See supra note 204-05.
255. See supra note 202 (arguing that malpractice liability is not a complete substitute
for reformation).
256. PAGE ON WiLLS, supra note 29, § 12.1 et seq.
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take and the consequences of choosing or declining to authorize refor-
mation. This concept is no more difficult to comprehend than stirpital
distributions,257 lapse 258 and many others incorporated directly or in-
directly in the dispositive provisions of the will.
The lawyer's explanation of reformation will be important, and
here it must be conceded that some will sign whatever the lawyer
places in front of them. For these clients, the benefit of the choice will
be lost. These clients are in no worse a position, however, than they
would be under a reformation system that permitted no choice so long
as the default rules and incentives are structured to channel these
clients to the optimal choice. The existence of malpractice liability
creates an incentive for lawyers to suggest opting into reformation, 25 9
and this incentive should preserve the opportunity for relief for these
acquiescent clients without forcing "relief' on those who determine
that reformation would not be in their best interests.
2. Disparity Between Wills and Testamentary Substitutes
If the proposal applies only to wills and not to will substitutes, it
will lessen, but not eliminate, the disparity between the two. Will
substitutes would continue to qualify for reformation under contract
principles 260 while wills would be subject to the special opt in require-
ment before reformation would be available. Initially, this would ap-
pear to be inferior to the Third Restatement which places wills and
testamentary substitutes on equal footing by equating reformation of
wills to reformation of contracts.2 61
If conformity of all facets of the law of wills and the law governing
testamentary substitutes is desirable, the goal could be achieved by
extending the approach to reformation proposed here to nontestamen-
257. The need to comprehend stirpital distributions arises whenever the testator be-
queaths property to his own issue or the issue of another. For a general descrip-
tion of the alternatives, see JULE STOCKER ET AL., STOCKER & RIKOON ON DRAWING
WrLLs & TRusTs § 2:13 (12th ed. 2000).
258. See supra note 41.
259. Recognizing the impact of the lawyer's self-interest in the client's decision
whether to elect reformation is not intended to suggest that the lawyer's interests
should prevail over the client's. Such a suggestion is clearly at odds with A.B.A.
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b), which provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by... the lawyer's own interests unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation.
260. Judicial decisions have observed the apparent incongruity in permitting reforma-
tion of will substitutes while denying reformation of wills. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Robinson, 720 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that inter vivos trust
with testamentary aspects may be reformed although will cannot be reformed).
261. THIRD RESTATEmENT, supra note 9, § 12.1 cmt. c.
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tary donative documents. Modifying the approach to reformation of
testamentary substitutes rather than replacing will reformation prin-
ciples with those of contract law would produce conformity without
relegating protection of accurately expressed testamentary intent to
post-death proceedings. This would create a disparity between con-
tracts and will substitutes, but there is an obvious justification for the
distinction: the party whose intent is at issue usually is deceased at
the time the problem arises.2 62 That argument is not developed here,
however, because the considerably less radical argument that differ-
ential treatment is justified may be made on several grounds.263
First, unification of the law of wills and testamentary substitutes
is desirable only because they are functional equivalents.2 64 Unifica-
tion of requirements governing validity of instruments is desirable be-
cause policy considerations underlying these requirements are
identical regardless of the mechanism used to effectuate the trans-
fer.2 65 Unification of default laws governing interpretation of dona-
tive documents that an individual may avoid by use of sufficiently
clear language should be unified as well because donative intent does
not differ based on the type of instrument utilized.2 66 Reformation
262. See Guliver & Tilson, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that as a practical matter, the
donor is almost always unavailable at the time the mistake is discovered). The
Second Restatement of Trusts would place all testamentary substitutes on equal
footing with wills by excluding the donor's testimony in cases where he is availa-
ble. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 332 cmts. c, e (1959).
263. The Second Restatement of Trusts would lend support to the proposition that tes-
tamentary substitutes should be differentiated from contracts for purposes of ref-
ormation. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 332 cmts. c, e (excluding
testimony of the donor in reformation proceedings on the grounds that the do-
nor's testimony is "inherently unreliable"). Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP. § 34.7 cmt. d (1992) (advocating, as the Third Restatement of Property does,
reliance on testimony of lawyers and those whose have or allege beneficial inter-
ests under the instrument in applications for reformation of both testamentary
and non-testamentary instruments). To make this argument persuasively, how-
ever, would require an exploration of the relationship between contracts and don-
ative transfers that is beyond the scope of this Article. For a sampling of recent
literature on the subject, see Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises, supra note 173;
Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 (1988/1989); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REv. 821
(1997); E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises to Make Gifts, AM. J. CoMP. LAw 359
(1995); Mary Louise Fellows, His to Give; His to Receive; Hers to Trust: A Re-
sponse to Carol M. Rose, 44 FLA. L. Rsv. 329 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Giving Some
Back-A Reprise, 44 FLA. L. REV. 365 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading,
Thieving and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Impor-
tantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295 (1992). See also John H. Langbein, The
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995).
264. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARv. L. Rsv. 1108, 1136-37 (1984).
265. See Langbein, supra note 22.
266. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 601, available at http'//www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
uta/trst400htm (adopting testamentary standard of capacity for revocable trusts).
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differs from default law and validity requirements, however, because
it permits re-writing of concededly valid instruments on an ad hoc ba-
sis. To extend contract reformation doctrine to testamentary instru-
ments would eliminate the opportunity to insulate an estate plan from
intent-defeating reformation. Consistency in the treatment of wills
and will substitutes is insufficient to justify this constriction in testa-
mentary freedom for those testators whose primary relationships en-
joy few, if any, other legal protectons.267
A second justification for different approaches to reformation for
wills versus will substitutes is that general unification of the law of
testamentary and non-testamentary transfers does not always require
precise identity in governing requirements. The dispensing power is a
prime example.268 The power exists to reduce formalities to more
nearly equate the law of testamentary and non-testamentary trans-
fers, yet it still retains as its touchstone the traditional requirements
of the Statute of Wills.269 The reformation proposal is structured sim-
ilarly: flexibility to achieve results paralleling those reached in cases
involving non-testamentary transfers is provided, but the Statute of
Wills remains the touchstone.
Finally, the enormity of the change itself can justify adherence to a
traditional rule even where dispositive intent may be similar for wills
and will substitutes. For example, an individual's dispositive desires
with respect to an interest created in a beneficiary who predeceases
the testator will not differ based on whether the desire is reflected in a
will or in a revocable trust. Under the doctrine of lapse, a testamen-
tary disposition to a predeceased beneficiary will be ineffective while a
disposition in a revocable trust to a beneficiary who predeceases the
grantor will pass to the beneficiary's personal representative unless
the governing instrument expressly provides otherwise. 270 This dis-
unity was rectified by the drafters of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code
to the chagrin of some. 271 The dispute was less about the probable
intent of the testator than it was about the extent of the burden that
such a fundamental change in the law of future interests would cre-
As a matter of decisional law, courts often, but not always, reach a parallel con-
clusion. Compare In re Dean, 967 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (determining
capacity to revoke trust based on testamentary standard), with In re Edson,
N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1997, at 31, col. 1 (Surr. Ct.) (requiring contractual capacity to
execute revocable trust).
267. See supra note 177.
268. See supra note 24.
269. See supra note 26.
270. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
271. David M. Becker, Uniform Probate Code § 2-707 and the Experienced Estate Plan-
ner: Unexpected Disasters and How to Avoid Them, 47 UCLA L. REV. 339 (1999);
Laura E. Cunningham, The Hazards of Tinkering With the Common Law of Fu-
ture Interests: The California Experience, 48 HASTn'Gs L.J. 667 (1997).
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ate.2 72 A similar argument can be made in the reformation context.
Desire to permit correction of mistakes may not vary based on
whether the estate plan is embodied in a will or a will substitute, but
effecting a fundamental change in the law of wills to preclude safe
harbor reliance changes the nature of the planning process in a man-
ner that even the most diligent testator or most astute lawyer cannot
with certainty manage.
V. CONCLUSION
The burden of exercising care in estate planning necessary to real-
ize testamentary freedom cannot be alleviated but rather only de-
ferred to litigation that occurs after the testator's death when he is
incapable of exercising the same degree of control over communication
of his wishes. This simply shifts the premium on factual knowledge,
effective expression and good lawyering from the testator and his es-
tate planner to competing beneficiaries and their litigators. Refusing
to permit this shift to occur in any circumstance, as strict application
of the historic approach does, precludes realization of intent in cases
where there is no offsetting benefit to the testator. Mandating the
shift, as the Third Restatement does, eliminates the opportunity to as-
sure that testamentary wishes may be realized through careful
planning.
To maximize the possibility of realizing testamentary freedom, in-
dividuals must be permitted to control the means by which their
unambiguously expressed wishes are understood after death. The
proposed approach to reformation advocated here confers that control
by allowing testators to elect whether to permit or preclude reforma-
tion, and thus to determine whether or not extrinsic evidence outside
the individual testator's control may supplement the court's under-
standing of his wishes as expressed in the will itself. Consequently,
the proposal provides a complete opportunity for relief from mistake
while protecting those who otherwise could be harmed by a more "lib-
eral" approach to reformation of testamentary instruments.
272. Compare David M. Becker, supra note 271 (arguing that the complexities of the
statute will cause those familiar with it to draft around it), with Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to
Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309 (1996) (arguing that the statute
reflects the dispositions a skilled planner would recommend). Other revisions to
the Uniform Probate Code are subject to similar disagreements. Compare
Ascher, supra note 215 (arguing changes to anti-lapse and ademption statutes
impose unwarranted burdens on experienced planners), with Fellows, supra note
215 (arguing the opposite).
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